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FOREWORD
The Human Rights Consortium is a 
broad alliance of over 160 civil society 
organisations from across all communities, 
sectors and areas of Northern Ireland who 
work together to help develop a human 
rights-based society. Since our foundation 
we have been raising awareness about and 
campaigning for a Bill of Rights as provided 
for in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement.
As a place emerging from the devastation of the troubles 
that still seeks greater stabilization, cohesion and 
reconciliation as a society, many continue to see a formal 
set of legal protections in a Bill of Rights as a core part of the 
shaping of that new society.
Indeed the Belfast Agreement’s own declaration of support 
says that we can best honour those who have died or 
been injured, and their families through ‘a fresh start, in 
which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement 
of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the 
protection and vindication of the human rights of all.’
However, despite that commitment, finding a way to 
formulate and sculpt the protection and vindication of the 
rights of all has made slow progress in Northern Ireland. 
Consensus at a political level on many rights issues, 
including the progression of a Bill of Rights, has been 
impossible to achieve to date.
The Consortium has felt that part of the inability to reach 
consensus on progressing a Bill of Rights has been rooted 
in the binary nature of some of the debates to date on the 
content and enforcement of such a Bill. Historically, a key 
point of debate in dialogue on a Bill of Rights has been the 
inclusion of economic and social rights (ESR) and the way 
such rights might be enforced.
From our perspective the ongoing case for the inclusion of 
basic ESR protections within a Bill of Rights is clear given 
both our historic and present difficulties in protecting and 
advancing such rights as a society. Political opinions on 
this topic are clearly divided however and major points 
of contention have focussed historically on those ESR, 
and particularly, the manner of their enforcement. With 
clear concerns by some politicians about the overlap and 
interplay between the role of elected representatives, the 
Northern Ireland Executive/Ministers, and the judiciary.
Those concerns have resulted in perhaps only two dominant 
perspectives being heard on the enforcement options for a 
Bill of Rights. Those could be best described as declaratory 
principles on the one hand and full enforceability on the 
other. The declaratory principles model would essentially be a 
commitment of the Northern Ireland government and elected 
representatives to uphold ESR. But there would be no legal 
mechanism or enforcement options to pro-actively ensure 
compliance with that declaration by elected representatives. 
On the opposite extreme is the model of full enforceability 
whereby any right articulated in a Bill of Rights is justiciable 
through the courts. This would likely include a variety of 
duties in line with international standards as regards ESR 
enforcement, such as duties to take appropriate measures, 
adopting the principles of progressive realisation and the 
concept of minimum core obligations.
Debates on the enforceability of ESR have largely stagnated 
at this point for several years and opportunities to engage in 
dialogue on alternative models or versions that seek to explore 
compromise have not featured enough in topical discussion.
So while the Consortium continues to see a fully enforceable 
model as offering the greatest potential regarding the 
protection of ESR in Northern Ireland, we recognise that 
wider debate on a broader range of ESR enforcement models 
may help play a positive role in enabling dialogue or potential 
compromise and consensus on this issue.
We have therefore commissioned a team of academics to 
explore through this report a variety of other enforcement 
opportunities that may exist for ESR. Their brief was 
to research and articulate other alternative models of 
enforcement of economic and social rights that existed 
between the spectrum from declaratory principles on one 
hand, to full enforceability on the other. We believe that the 
five models they have developed in this Consortium report 
represent a significant contribution to the debate on this 
important aspect of the Bill of Rights and we are grateful for 
their efforts and expertise in delivering this project. We hope 
that by developing this report we can contribute much needed 
food for thought into these discussions, help the exploration 
of how ESR can best be enforced in Northern Ireland and 
potentially assist in the development of consensus on this 
issue at all levels in Northern Ireland.
Northern Ireland needs the added security of strong social 
and economic rights protections within a Bill of Rights as 
much now as it ever has. To do so we need to develop a 
model of rights enforcement that fits within our governance 
frameworks, is workable by our elected representatives and 
represents a significant advancement in the protections on 
offer to the most vulnerable in our society. If we are to achieve 
this vision of a strong and inclusive Bill of Rights, Northern 
Ireland could potentially be a world leading destination 
as regards the protection of rights and a place to be proud 
of. We hope that this report can make a useful and timely 
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EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
‘Economic, social and cultural rights 
are those human rights relating to the 
workplace, social security, family life, 
participation in cultural life, and access 
to housing, food, water, health care and 
education.’1
Economic, social and cultural rights are set out in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the Council of Europe’s Social Rights Charter, the EU’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, and other equivalent legal 
provisions. In this Executive Summary, we present a brief 
outline of five models for enforcement in Northern Ireland 
of economic and social rights (ESR) that are considered in 
greater detail in the main report. We use the term ‘model’ to 
describe these, not in the sense that they are ‘models of best 
practice’, but simply to indicate that there are various methods 
already developed which differ from each other in significant 
ways. The focus of our Report is on the implementation of 
economic and social rights, given their importance in the 
historical context of human rights in Northern Ireland, where 
complaints regarding the failure of the state to deliver basic 
services and rights have a frequent source of conflict. We have 
largely excluded discussion of cultural rights, not because 
they are less important, but because they may give rise to 
somewhat different issues in their effective implementation.
We have been commissioned by the Human Rights 
Consortium to identify possible methods of enforcing ESR 
in Northern Ireland that span the middle of the spectrum 
between full enforceability on the one hand and declaratory 
principles on the other. The purpose of doing so, we 
understand, is to stimulate debate about how ESR could be 
better delivered, even if the approach of what we shall call 
‘full justiciability’ (that is, the ability of courts to enforce ESR 
directly in the same way as other human rights under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), such as the 
right to freedom of expression is enforced) is not adopted. As 
individuals, several of the authors have taken public positions 
on the desirability of such a move. As a group, however, 
we do not take a position on whether such full justiciability 
should be adopted; nor do we rule out further legislative or 
constitutional reform explicitly recognising socio-economic 
rights.
So, too, in a similar vein, we are conscious that the Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) has provided its 
Advice to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. If adopted, the NIHRC’s Bill 
of Rights, which contains socio-economic rights among 
others, would make it unlawful to act incompatibly with 
them. Several of the authors were involved in various ways 
in developing the NIHRC’s approach. Again, as a group, we 
neither endorse nor reject these proposals. Nothing we are 
proposing stands in the way of the enactment of a strong and 
inclusive Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. The models we 
discuss below do not replace such an approach; nor do they 
prevent such an approach. But they could be adopted even 
if such approaches as expanding the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA) to encompass ESR or adopting a Bill of Rights along 
the line of that proposed by the NIHRC were rejected within 
Northern Ireland.
Here are the five models we discuss in this Report:
Model 1: pre-legislative scrutiny by the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and amending the Ministerial Code of Northern 
Ireland Ministers
Model 2: including socio-economic requirements in specific 
legislation
Model 3: Constitutionalizing ESR principles, where the 
Assembly has principal responsibility to implement
Model 4: Progressive implementation and restricted judicial 
review, such as on grounds of reasonableness
Model 5: Incorporating ESR in future free trade agreements 
applying to Northern Ireland
Our development of these models has been an iterative 
process, involving discussion internally within the group. 
We do not rank these models in terms of their political 
feasibility or effectiveness, and the listing of the options 
from 1 to 5 does not indicate any such preference. Nor do 
we as a group or as individuals necessarily propose any 
of these as a preferred option, singly or together; but they 
seem to us among the leading candidates situated on the 
spectrum between full justiciability of ‘subjective rights’ 
(which we consider subsequently) and simply declaratory, 
tending towards the middle of that spectrum. These options 
were tested and scrutinized at later stages in the process 
including by those who participated in a peer-review event 
with interested stakeholders (see Acknowledgements for 
details). The Northern Ireland Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee 
on the Bill of Rights will also have the opportunity of 
considering these options and commenting on them, as part 
of its broader inquiry. With that caveat, we turn to sketch out 
the bare bones of each model. There is already extensive, 
if patchy, implementation of various economic and social 
rights in Northern Ireland law, even if these protections are 
not labelled as such. In this context, we need to take into 
account both common law and statutory provisions regarding 
rights in the housing, social security, education, employment, 
human rights, and equality contexts. All of these go some way 
towards meeting some aspects of internationally-protected 
ESR, but taken together they still fall short of protecting all 
internationally-protected ESR to the degree required to 
satisfy international obligations, as any of the recent reports 
on the state of ESR in Northern Ireland by the Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights makes clear.2
The existing protections do mean, however, that any new 
initiative is not starting from scratch, which has implications 
for how best to proceed. The models we discuss below 
should be regarded as additional to the construction of 
complementary mechanisms, in civil society particularly, to 
better enable existing rights that directly or indirectly protect 
ESR rights, to be implemented more effectively. In particular, 
it will be important to consider ways in which existing rights 
could be better mobilised to serve the goal of securing the 
effective protection of ESR. On the one hand, therefore, the 
aim of the Report is to enable ESR to be enhanced. On the 
other hand, there are also developments (the budgetary costs 
of dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic, the economic effects 
of the UK’s exit from the EU, among others) that lead some to 
be concerned that it may be difficult even to sustain existing 
levels of ESR protection. The aim of the Report is also to 
identify, therefore, how existing ESR might best be protected.
Model 1: pre-legislative scrutiny by the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and amending the Ministerial Code of Northern 
Ireland Ministers
Model 1 is based on the proposition that placing responsibility 
for dealing with ESR on local politicians could be an effective 
way in which Ministers and civil servants would be regularly 
reminded of international legal obligations to implement 
socio-economic rights in Northern Ireland. One way of doing 
so would be to establish, probably through a change in the 
Standing Orders of the Assembly, an additional committee 
charged with regular pre-legislative scrutiny of Bills going 
through the Assembly for compliance with ESR. Anticipating 
that such scrutiny would occur should stimulate Ministers and 
1 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet #33, 2008. 
2 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic 
report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, E/C.12/GBR/CO/6, 14 July 2016.
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civil servants to take such rights more seriously in the context 
of considering policy options. This ensures a certain degree 
of mainstreaming at the pre-legislative stage.
The approach developed in Model 1 could be taken 
somewhat further but stopping short of requiring legislative 
changes. This would require an amendment to the current 
Ministerial Code of Northern Ireland Ministers requiring 
Ministers to take ESR into account in exercising their 
Ministerial responsibilities. (At the moment, there is only 
a vague requirement on Ministers to uphold the ‘rule of 
law’, and the Attorney General produces human rights 
guidance, based on a range of international standards.) An 
amendment to the Ministerial Code could have the effect 
of further stimulating Ministers and civil servants serving 
those Ministers to build consideration of ESR into the fabric 
of decision-making in those areas in which powers have 
been devolved, as well as serving as a potentially important 
requirement on Ministers in carrying out negotiations with 
Westminster/Whitehall on policies relevant to Northern 
Ireland, where powers have not been devolved. This 
would also assist the Secretary of State who has the power 
to intervene if Ministers are in breach of international 
obligations (Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 26).
This model could be constructed in such a way as to be of 
particular relevance for the budgetary process. One of the 
issues that a Committee of the Assembly could consider 
would be building a role for the Committee into the budget 
process. Another variation would be to put a duty on the 
Department of Finance and Personnel to track spending 
against the realization of specific ESR, putting an emphasis 
on how ESR would be furthered within the lifetime of the 
relevant budgetary process. Another issue for consideration 
would be whether the Committee adopts an advisory role 
or a supervisory one. In this sense, the legal status of the 
Committee’s decisions could be considered – i.e. whether 
the decisions would be persuasive (soft enforcement) or 
binding (strong enforcement) on the Assembly. Changing 
the Ministerial Code could also have significant implications 
for the budget process. The (UK) Treasury Green Book 
already refers specifically to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as something to be 
taken into account in devising and testing policy options. 
Much useful work has, of course, already been done in 
Northern Ireland on budgeting in a range of contexts, 
including gender budgeting, children’s rights budget, and 
socio-economic rights budgeting.
Model 2: including socio-economic requirements in
 specific legislation
In Model 2, the approach taken would be to insert references 
to ESR in specific pieces of Assembly or Westminster 
legislation applying to Northern Ireland. One example could 
be section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act (NIA), which might 
be amended to include something like ‘socio-economic 
status’ as one of the grounds subject to the mainstreaming 
requirements of Schedule 10 of the Act. This would generate 
significant obligations, both substantive and procedural, on 
public bodies generally to engage in regular consultations with 
civil society on how policies and practices impact on those 
of lower socio-economic status. On the other hand, in the 
past there have been objections to opening up section 75 to 
legislative scrutiny, and concerns have been expressed as to 
the robustness of the (effectively non-justiciable) ‘due regard’ 
duty, and so we consider below whether the risks in amending 
section 75 outweigh any advantages. It should be noted that 
section 1 of the Equality Act 2010, which does not extend to 
Northern Ireland, has been devolved to Scotland and Wales 
(although the provision is not yet commenced in Wales). This 
means that Westminster has devolved the power to introduce 
a socio-economic equality duty to the Scottish Parliament 
and Welsh Assembly (since May 2020, the Welsh Parliament) 
respectively. With the process of devolving the power now 
complete in Scotland if used Scotland will be the first part of 
the UK to protect those from socio-economic deprivation 
based on a procedural due regard duty (the section was never 
commenced at a GB level). With Scotland and Wales now in 
a position to introduce a socio-economic equality duty this 
could set a precedent for amendment to section 75, which 
would require Westminster’s approval. The opportunity 
could also then be taken to reflect on the effectiveness of the 
enforcement provisions attached to section 75 and whether 
these could be strengthened and improved.
Another possible approach within this Model would be for 
the Assembly to be persuaded to see the benefits in further 
protecting specific aspects of ESR piecemeal in Assembly 
legislation. In creating the Northern Ireland Commissioner for 
Children and Young People (NICCY) and the Commissioner for 
Older People for Northern Ireland (COPNI), the desirability of 
having regard to international standards was written into the 
legislation. Building on this approach, a specific ‘due regard’ 
obligation with reference to ESR might be introduced in 
Assembly legislation addressing particular topics, for example 
in the education, employment, health, housing and disability 
fields, perhaps at the initiative of ‘backbench’ Members of 
the Northern Ireland Assembly (MLAs). There is also scope 
to consider whether the Assembly might adopt a form of 
holistic incorporation similar to the Welsh Assembly Measure 
that introduced a duty to have due regard to the United 
Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child. This 
kind of legislation is within the competence of the Assembly 
and could provide a ‘self-regulatory’ mechanism for ESR in 
observance of international obligations (Schedule 2 paragraph 
3(c) NIA 1998). For example, the Assembly could introduce 
a duty to have due regard to ICESCR when legislating in 
devolved areas.
Model 3: Constitutionalizing ESR principles, where the 
Assembly has principal responsibility to implement
Constitutions often play the vital function of identifying what 
are the fundamental values that a country espouses and 
seeks to uphold. Sometimes these values are articulated as 
‘rights’ that may be enforced by courts. There is, however, 
no reason of principle why some fundamental values 
identified in a constitution should not be separated off and 
made non-justiciable duties rather than justiciable rights. 
The Constitutions of Ireland (1937) and India (1950) both 
incorporate non-directly justiciable duties on the State 
(the so-called Directive Principles) to apply certain socio-
economic principles when making laws.3 There are degrees 
of ESR enforceability in these models and sometimes the 
judiciary can play a role in enforcement, short of making ESR 
rights fully justiciable in the same way as civil and political 
rights. In India, for example, the courts have subsequently 
extended ESR protection through a dynamic interpretation of 
civil and political rights drawing on the Directive Principles.
A variation on these approaches is to be found in the 
Constitution of Finland, in which several ESR are mentioned, 
but the responsibility is placed on the legislature to implement 
these rights, and litigation is based largely on the specific 
legislation enacted to implement the right, rather than the 
Constitution itself. For example, section 16 on educational 
rights provides in part: ‘The public authorities shall, as 
provided in more detail by an Act, guarantee …’. Section 17, 
on the right to one’s language and culture, provides in part: 
‘The right of everyone to use his or her own language … shall 
be guaranteed by an Act.’ Section 18, on the right to work, 
provides in part: ‘Everyone has the right, as provided by an Act, 
to earn his or her livelihood …’. Section 19, on the right to social 
security, provides in part: ‘Everyone shall be guaranteed by an 3 Ireland has held a Constitutional Convention which has recommended changing the constitution to include 
justiciable ESR, see further below.
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Act the right to basic subsistence.’ There is therefore a robust 
ESR constitutional framework but the legislature retains a 
strong degree of control over how ESR are interpreted and 
enforced. The court performs ex post judicial review in the 
context of the legislation introduced to fulfil ESR.
It should be noted, however, that in two respects the approach 
in Finland does not leave matters entirely in the hands of the 
legislature. First, whilst the Finnish example places a strong 
emphasis on the legislature as the state body responsible 
for implementing ESR, there are some constitutional ESR 
provisions which are treated as creating subjective justiciable 
minimum-core rights, such as Article 19(1), which protects 
the right to social assistance, in particular in connection with 
issues such as emergency health care based on the concept of 
dignity. Second, the Finnish constitutional model is supported 
by a Constitutional Committee that scrutinises legislation for 
ESR compatibility pre-enactment, so-called ex ante review. 
This approach can therefore be considered in the wider 
context of Model 2. This review is binding on Parliament. 
This can be compared to the weaker enforcement of pre-
legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament conducted by the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights where the decisions of the 
Committee are not binding on Parliament.
Model 4: Progressive implementation and restricted judicial 
review, such as on grounds of reasonableness
Courts in the United Kingdom currently interpret and 
apply human rights set out in the Human Rights Act using 
an approach that sets a high bar for those seeking to justify 
breaches of human rights. An approach could be adopted 
that required courts to set a much lower bar in the context 
of ESR. The Joint Committee on Human Rights of the United 
Kingdom House of Commons and House of Lords proposed 
a model of phased implementation short of the adoption 
of fully enforceable subjective rights by a rights’ holder in 
court. The Joint Committee put forward for consideration an 
approach, which would initially only include a limited range of 
rights (health, education, housing, and an adequate standard 
of living). As applied to Northern Ireland, the Assembly and 
Executive would be under a duty to take reasonable legislative 
and other measures within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realization of these rights. The Assembly and 
Executive would be given the primary obligation to decide 
how best to achieve that agreed aim. So far, this looks similar 
to Model 3. There are, however, two ways in which this 
approach might move towards more legal enforceability.
The first approach would be to allow a five- to ten-year 
window in which no judicial enforcement of these rights 
would be permitted, but after which the rights would be fully 
enforceable as subjective rights by aggrieved individuals, thus 
enabling the Assembly and Executive to get its house in order, 
but with an effective deadline for doing so. This is similar to 
the delayed remedy mechanism in Canada, which might prove 
a useful approach to adopt. The second approach would be 
to provide that individuals would not be able to enforce these 
rights for themselves (these are often referred to as ‘subjective 
rights), but would be able to review the reasonableness 
of the actions taken or not taken by the Assembly and 
Executive. These approaches might be combined, with a 
staged implementation, followed by judicial review only on 
reasonableness grounds.
There is also scope to consider within the second, third and 
fourth models, in particular, whether there are particular 
types of innovative remedies which the courts could adopt 
which help to build on the positive balance of responsibilities 
between the courts and the Assembly and Executive. For 
example, issuing an order that would have no suspensory 
effect on the continuation of a provision found not to be 
in compliance with ESR principles, allowing time for the 
Assembly to amend the provision to secure compatibility. 
Other judicial remedies might be considered, where the court 
declares an action unlawful and then defers the issue back to 
the Assembly or Executive and then plays a supervisory role in 
ensuring compliance with the judgment.
Model 5: Continued application of EU-derived ESR through 
their incorporation in any future free trade agreement 
between the UK and the EU relating to Northern Ireland
This fifth model has been developed specifically to address 
the circumstances that will apply following the United 
Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. We considered how, 
in particular, the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly 
might best address ESR issues that will arise in future trade 
and investment agreements that will apply in Northern 
Ireland, and are likely to significantly influence the ability of 
any Northern Ireland government to advance (indeed, even 
to maintain) ESR in the future. There are two core ideas, 
addressing two different aspects of the UK’s exit from the EU: 
the loss of EU-based ESR protections; and the danger to ESR of 
the need to negotiate trade and investment agreements with 
non-EU states.
First, the EU, when negotiating a free trade or investment 
agreement with the United Kingdom (either generally or one 
relating to the Northern Ireland dimensions) would insist 
that the United Kingdom continue to implement a basic set 
of human rights requirements (including ESR) as a condition 
for that agreement being concluded. Second, in any trade or 
investment agreement with non-EU states, provisions could 
be included that would directly or indirectly protect the 
Northern Ireland Assembly’s ability to legislate in the area 
of ESR, human rights, and social policy. Otherwise, there is 
a danger that future trade or investment agreements could 
undermine that ability.
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CHAPTER 1: 
CONTEXT
In this section, we set out the key contextual 
issues that have and will continue to affect 
consideration of economic and social rights, 
in Northern Ireland in particular. They 
will also affect how the models we discuss 
subsequently in the Report are likely to be 
viewed immediately, and over time. They are 
listed in no particular order of importance.
(a) East-West issues
There are three overlapping East-West issues. First, as with 
many issues concerning human rights and equality, there are 
concerns at Westminster and in Whitehall about the possible 
impact that incorporating ESR in Northern Ireland would, or 
might, have on legislative and policy developments in England 
and Wales, or in the United Kingdom as a whole. This ‘read-
across’ effect will need to be addressed effectively if this issue 
is not to derail the adoption of any of the proposed models. 
In particular, powers to disallow legislation or executive 
action that would be directly or indirectly discriminatory 
against economic operators in the other nations of the UK, 
contrary to the effectiveness of the UK’s internal market, 
may impose constraints on the ability of Northern Ireland to 
adopt ESR, were they to be legislated in the form envisaged.1 
Second, an additional wild card is the proposed modification/
repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998. The ESR enforcement 
models would be operating in a different legal and political 
context were the HRA to be significantly amended. The 
Conservative Party, in its 2019 General Election Manifesto, 
has committed to updating the Human Rights Act and 
administrative law ‘to ensure that there is a proper balance 
between the rights of individuals, our vital national security 
and effective government. We will ensure that judicial review 
is available to protect the rights of the individuals against 
an overbearing state, while ensuring that it is not abused 
to conduct politics by another means or to create needless 
delays.’ The implications of this commitment are, as yet, 
unclear. Third, there is a separate question as to the approach 
that will be taken over time by the Scottish Government 
to ESR, in the context of the recent changes regarding the 
powers of the Scottish Parliament, including the transfer of 
competence on the socio-economic equality duty contained 
in section 1 of the Equality Act 2010 (Scotland Act 2016, ss 38, 
72). More recently, a National Task Force has been established 
by the Scottish Government2 tasked with implementing the 
recommendations of the First Minister’s Advisory Group on 
Human Rights Leadership.3 These recommendations include a 
new statutory framework in Scotland incorporating economic 
and social rights into domestic law.
(b) North-South issues
The issue of how ESR should be enforced has, in the past, 
been significantly influenced by the (lack) of priority accorded 
such rights in constitutional negotiations in Northern Ireland. 
Were the ESR issue to be seen as part of such negotiations, 
the Government of Ireland would be involved and this would 
affect the priority to be given to such issues in relation to other 
issues. On the one hand, there may be significant possibilities 
for delivering ESR, through cross-border initiatives, e.g. on 
health, food safety and transport, some of which could be 
promoted by the North-South bodies. On the other hand, 
there is a somewhat equivalent ‘read-across’ concern in 
Ireland (in UK terminology ‘the Republic of Ireland’) to that in 
Westminster/Whitehall, and an even greater concern that the 
requirement of ‘equivalence’ regarding human rights in the 
Belfast-Good Friday Agreement would put additional pressure 
on the Irish Government to introduce new (and expensive, 
or so it is thought) ESR in Ireland, at a time when government 
social spending is already under severe pressure. In February 
2014, the Constitutional Convention in Ireland recommended 
that particular ESRs, such as the right to a home, be better 
protected in the Irish Constitution, including introducing 
some forms of justiciable ESR.4 If the constitutional 
arrangements for ESR were to be revisited in Ireland, there 
is the potential for a future referendum on the issue on the 
basis of the Convention’s recommendation, and this may 
affect debate on ESR in Northern Ireland. The debate about 
constitutionalising socio-economic rights in Ireland will also 
impact on how we assess feasibility issues concerning a Bill of 
Rights with socio-economic rights in Northern Ireland.
(c) Party political differences
The current formal position of several unionist parties (and 
particularly of the Democratic Unionist Party -- DUP) is 
largely hostile to previous models of enforceability of ESR 
in Northern Ireland. In part, this concern arises from ESR 
being perceived as part of a ‘left’ agenda, whereas the DUP is 
predominantly conservative; in part, their opposition is also 
due to the perception that human rights in general are part 
of a nationalist/republican agenda. It remains to be seen, 
of course, whether the DUP may reconsider their position, 
leading to the possibility that either or both of these concerns 
might be easier to alleviate in the near future than has proved 
to be the case in the past. It is not without significance that, 
in recent elections, many of the party manifestos across the 
political divides have included what would be commonly 
understood as ‘social justice’ concerns. And opinion 
polling indicates a degree of apparent consensus about the 
desirability of ESR among supporters of different political 
persuasions.5
(d) Institutional and constitutional issues
A significant concern is the currently complicated legal 
issue of the powers of the Northern Ireland Assembly and 
Executive over areas of policy and expenditure in which issues 
of ESR most commonly arise, such as employment, housing, 
social security, refugee and asylum policy, and education. 
Whilst pretty much the whole of individual and collective 
employment law is devolved to the Assembly (except the 
topic of national insurance contributions), in several of the 
other areas, the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive 
either shares responsibility with Westminster/Whitehall, or 
is subject to control by it. This raises the question as to how 
far it is possible or desirable for ESR enforcement models 
to attempt to address areas outside the direct and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Assembly/Executive. The intensification of 
discussions about broader constitutional change both on the 
island of Ireland, and across these islands may alter the way in 
which the Bill of Rights debate is perceived.
More immediately, however, as we were completing this 
Report, the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill was 
introduced into the Westminster Parliament. Apart from the 
adverse impact of the Bill on the United Kingdom’s reputation 
for upholding international law, if the Bill were passed in 
its current form, it would likely have significant impact on 
the current devolution of powers to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. However that issue is finally resolved, the 
fact that it has arisen at all indicates that the current structure 
of devolution is not set in stone and that the distribution 
of powers may well change significantly in the future, with 
potentially significant effects on the ability of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly and Executive to act in policy areas that 
engage ESR.
Another issue that frequently arises has constitutional 
dimensions of a different nature. This is the issue of how 
far efforts to further protect and promote ESR weakens 







4 The new Irish Government has committed in its Programme for Government to hold referendums on 
the rights of women (Art 41.2 of the Constitution) and on housing.
5 Human Rights Consortium, Attitudes to Human Rights in Northern Ireland: Polling Data (July, 2017).
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democratic controls and, in particular, undermines the role 
of politicians in handling economic and social issues through 
orthodox political channels. Whilst there is a real debate 
to be had about the extent to which some issues should be 
taken out of day-to-day political contestation, some of the 
concerns that may underlie that debate are misplaced. It is 
already the case that there is extensive statutory provision in 
Northern Ireland of ESR, with legislation dealing with social 
security, housing, education, and welfare, among others. 
This legislation is, of course, subject to judicial interpretation 
and enforcement. So, to regard ESR as some exotic set of 
rights that are alien to the Northern Ireland legal and political 
system, or to regard such rights as inherently unsuitable for 
judges to consider, is very wide of the mark. Nevertheless, 
to the extent that there are concerns that the role of the 
Assembly and the Executive could be weakened, it is worth 
considering whether Assembly- or Executive-driven ESR 
mechanisms can be devised that would strengthen their role 
in the ESR context.
(e) Bureaucratic and administrative concerns
The issue here is the extent to which, leaving aside party-
political concerns, and political concerns arising from Great 
Britain or Ireland, ESR enforcement models need to take into
account, and meet, concerns from the permanent Civil 
Service, particularly over the increased administrative 
burden that they may think likely to arise with increased 
attention being given to ESR, and the budgetary implications, 
particularly for the Block Grant. Would the Treasury be 
prepared to fund more extensive provision of ESR and the 
higher social spending in Northern Ireland that may result 
if that was significantly different from the other parts of the 
United Kingdom? Apart from the devolution context, there 
is an additional significant budgetary consideration: how 
far would strengthening provision for ESR simply lead to 
robbing Peter to pay Paul; taking resources from housing, 
say, to increase social security spending? These are clearly 
significant issues, and raise broad questions of how to ensure 
that all areas of social policy are adequately funded, including 
whether a re-examination is necessary of who should bear the 
burden of funding a society that fully respects human rights, 
and at what level, issues that are beyond the scope of this 
Report.
(f) Judicial issues
For any model of ESR enforcement to be effective that relies 
on some element of judicial involvement (through judicial 
review, for example), it is necessary to take into account the 
likely reactions of Northern Ireland judges and (possibly) 
the reaction of the UK Supreme Court. Judicial review in 
Northern Ireland has already allowed courts to enhance the 
protection of ESR through application of the principle of 
non-discrimination.6 However, the test that has been adopted 
by the Supreme Court (whether the contested measure 
is ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’7) sets a high 
bar for claimants to overcome if they are to succeed.8 The 
international and comparative evidence seems to confirm 
that if human rights, including socio-economic rights are not 
spelled out with precision in a sufficiently robust document, 
they will be ignored by politicians and may be subject to 
sceptical interpretation by judges. Rights also need to be used 
by victims of human rights violations, and the courts’ attention 
brought to these rights. Linked to the question of judicial 
recognition is the question of how, if at all, ESR rights might be 
mobilised, and the role of civil society in doing so, including 
the cost implications for this sector.
Whether, and to what extent, judicial involvement in such 
contexts is politically acceptable has changed over the past 
few years, at least in Britain. Partly because of the sensitivity 
of judicial scrutiny of various aspects of the exit of the United 
Kingdom from the EU, partly because of heightened political 
awareness of judicial review over administrative decision-
making, and partly because of application of human rights 
in areas which had not been anticipated (such as the war 
in Iraq), there has been something of a backlash among 
politicians against ‘activist’ judges. As a result of this backlash, 
a panel to review judicial review was recently appointed by 
the UK Government to consider ‘whether the right balance 
is being struck between the rights of citizens to challenge 
executive decisions and the need for effective and efficient 
government.’9 So, irrespective of what the Panel recommends 
as regards existing areas of judicial review, receptivity to 
judicial involvement in what are perceived to be novel areas 
has been severely reduced. What might have been politically 
relatively uncontroversial a few years’ ago, is now anything but. 
How this change would affect the role of courts in the context 
of ESR is uncertain, but is hardly likely to be positive.
(g) Expectations of NGO and other sectors
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
recommends that ESR ought to be protected by states in 
the same way that civil and political rights are protected.10 
Civil and political rights enjoy protection under the UK-wide 
Human Rights Act 1998 and also at the devolved level in 
Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 These 
statutory regimes embed civil and political rights (and some 
very basic economic and social rights, such as the right to 
education) found in the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR) into the domestic legal system. They also form 
an important part of the Belfast-Good Friday Agreement as a 
minimum level of rights required in order to build a stable and 
peaceful society.11 According to the UN Committee, economic 
and social rights, by extension, ought to be protected in 
the same manner – such as through an extension of the 
statutory regime embedding a treaty that focusses on ESR. 
This approach is one that is particularly strongly supported by 
sections of civil society in Northern Ireland.
There is a significant issue in relation to maintaining a balance 
between meeting (some of) the expectations of the (diverse) 
NGO sector (expectations that are shared by others beyond 
this sector) and ensuring that proposed models are seen by 
those responsible for adopting and implementing ESR as 
politically desirable and effective in practice. Sections of the 
NGO sector have traditionally been ambitious in terms of 
what can and should be delivered by ESR enforcement, and 
there has been a wide gulf between those expectations and 
what has, so far, proved politically feasible. Identifying this 
gap is not to imply either that the NGO sector should be less 
ambitious, or that others should be less cautious; nor is it to 
imply that the NGO sector is unconcerned with effectiveness 
and political desirability; it has carried out significant work on 
the ineffectiveness of the Government’s current approaches to 
delivering ESR. But if the gap in expectations is not narrowed, 
it is clear that nothing very much is likely to change.
(h) International reputation and inward investment
There is evidence that a significant element in decisions 
involving whether inward investment flows into the state 
involves the reputation of the state receiving the investment. 
One of the reputational considerations that concern investors 
involves the extent to which (some) socio-economic rights 
are protected; this is because investors want to be reassured 
that their reputations will not be tarnished by allegations 
concerning child labour, poverty wages, inadequate housing 
provision, or similar violations of ESR. One of the ways in 
which investors’ concerns in this regard can be addressed is 
by the state that seeks and receives inward investment having 
a robust reputation for ensuring ESR. Apart from reputational 
issues, European states have resisted a ‘race to the bottom’, 
where states compete with each other on the basis of which 
6 E.g. Re Denise Brewster’s Application for JR [2017] UKSC 8 (entitlement to a local government pension) and In 
the matter of an application by Siobhan McLaughlin for Judicial Review [2018] UKSC 48 (entitlement to a widowed 
parent’s allowance). 7 For example, R. (on the application of DA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2019] 
UKSC 21.
8 Jed Meers, Problems with the “manifestly without reasonable foundation” test, (2020) 27(1) Journal of Social 
Security Law 12.
9 Details available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-launches-independent-panel-to-look-
at-judicial-review.
10 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 9: The domestic 
application of the Covenant, 3 December 1998, E/C.12/1998/24, para.7
11 The Belfast Agreement 1998 / The Good Friday Agreement 1998, annexed to the Agreement between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland (with 
annexes), Belfast, 10 April 1998, Registration No. 1.36776 UNTS 2114, Treaty series No.50 (2000) Cm 4705. Referred to 
as the ‘peace agreement’, para.5(2)(b)(c)
10
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND: MODELS OF ENFORCEABILITY NOVEMBER 2020
can lower their social standards most. This is discussed further 
in the context of the fifth model.
(i) Northern Ireland Bill of Rights debate
As noted above, the context within which this Report is 
situated also involves the continuing debate over a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights dealing with the particular circumstances 
of Northern Ireland, and deriving from the Belfast-Good 
Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission statutory consultation process.
The Agreement invited the newly established Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission to ‘to consult and to 
advise on the scope for defining, in Westminster legislation, 
rights supplementary to those in the European Convention 
on Human Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of 
Northern Ireland, drawing as appropriate on international 
instruments and experience. These additional rights to reflect 
the principles of mutual respect for the identity and ethos of 
both communities and parity of esteem, and - taken together 
with the ECHR - to constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland.’12 The NIHRC’s final advice contained a comprehensive 
list of economic and social rights. The Northern Ireland Office 
rejected the proposed Bill of Rights and was opposed to the 
inclusion of ESR.13 Furthermore, the Commission for a UK-
wide Bill of Rights, established by a previous Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Government largely rejected the inclusion
of such rights in any future Bill of Rights for the UK but did 
argue that a UK Bill of Rights process should not interfere with 
the distinct NI Bill of Rights process.14 The NIHRC has argued 
that the failure properly to consider its recommendations to 
the Secretary of State in relation to a Bill of Rights undermines 
the peace process.15
The political impasse that had ensued with various 
government administrations at the macro level and the lack 
of consensus between political parties at the micro level, had 
brought the process to a standstill until the New Decade, New 
Approach Agreement in January 2020 provided for an Ad-
Hoc Assembly Committee to be established to consider the 
creation of a Bill of Rights. The Belfast-Good Friday Agreement 
anticipates that a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights would be 
adopted in Westminster legislation, perhaps anticipating that 
there might not be political consensus in Northern Ireland. 
The current UK Government had to this point seemed 
unwilling, however, to advance a Northern Ireland Bill without 
local agreement. Whilst it might be seen to lack democratic 
legitimacy to enact legislation without a local political 
consensus, there has until this latest development arguably 
been a democratic failure at the macro level to facilitate 
consensus at the micro level. Given the commitments 
contained in the Agreement on the continued enhancement 
of human rights protection in Northern Ireland (beyond 
the ECHR) there is an arguable case that the avoidance of 
addressing the ESR human rights legal deficit undermines 
the transition to peace,16 particularly in failing to address the 
‘relationship between social and economic grievances and the 
conflict’.17 On the other hand, the lack of political consensus in 
fact undermines any further progression on the matter.
Introducing legislative provisions that protect ESR in Northern 
Ireland without corresponding measures being available 
in the rest of UK may contribute to a substantial gap in the 
protection of human rights across the state. Whilst this would 
be consistent with devolution, it arguably goes against the 
very principle of the universality of human rights.18 Separate 
provisions for Northern Ireland have been seen by some, for 
example Lady Trimble, as potentially leading ‘to rights tourists 
coming to Northern Ireland to avail of these proposed rights 
which are not necessarily going to be available to people 
in other parts of the UK, or even in other parts of Europe, 
because what is proposed goes so much beyond what is in the 
European Convention, and so much beyond what is in the
Human Rights Act’.19 Lady Trimble’s concerns have been 
echoed by Stephen Pound MP, a member of the Northern 
Ireland Affairs Committee (2007-2010).20
On the other hand, this insistence on a UK-wide approach 
may appear to contradict the very language of the 
NIHRC’s mandate, which expressly refers to the ‘particular 
circumstances of Northern Ireland’. In addition, protections 
for human rights and equality, including socio-economic 
rights, are already implemented to different degrees across 
the UK – the Equality Act 2010, for example, does not apply 
in Northern Ireland. As discussed above, Northern Ireland 
sits in isolation from the rest of the UK in terms of equality 
provisions, and socio-economic rights are enforced to 
different degrees across the UK.
In fact, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights are 
all given effect to in different ways and protected to varying 
degrees across the UK’s four jurisdictions. For example, 
the devolved statutes embed the ECHR creating a quasi-
constitutional application of civil and political rights in the 
devolved legal framework. The devolved legislatures are 
bound to comply with the ECHR and ECHR jurisprudence 
has extended civil and political rights protection to socio-
economic rights in certain circumstances. This means there 
is a more robust framework at the devolved level than the 
national level (with less protection of rights for those living 
in England). The Equality Act 2010 extends some procedural 
protection to socio-economic rights and the Scotland Act 
2016 devolved the socio-economic equality duty to the 
Scottish Parliament. The Equality Act 2010 does not extend 
to Northern Ireland where the equality duty is governed by 
the Northern Ireland Act 1998 – meaning there are different 
legal mechanisms in each of the devolved regions in relation 
to equality requirements – each of which protect socio-
economic rights in different ways. Not only do protection 
mechanisms differ significantly, the devolved jurisdictions are 
on different trajectories in progressive protection mechanisms 
whilst the national level has been seen as increasingly 
regressive.
(j) Brexit
Since commencing this project, the United Kingdom has 
voted in a referendum to leave the European Union (although 
Northern Ireland voted by a majority to remain in the EU), and 
negotiations to achieve this have now resulted in a Withdrawal 
Agreement, together with an Ireland-Northern Ireland 
Protocol, Article 2 of which seeks to ensure that, following 
the transition period, there will be no diminution of rights 
and equality obligations enshrined in the Belfast-Good Friday 
Agreement, resulting from UK exit. In addition, negotiations 
are currently under way for a broader future relations 
agreement between the UK and the EU. At the time of writing, 
it is uncertain whether there will be such an agreement or 
what it will contain.
The UK parliament has decided to continue to apply many 
rights in UK domestic law that were previously protected by 
EU law (or, rather, some elements of them) even though the 
UK leaves the EU. This is provided for in the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018. However, the continuation of these 
rights will, as provided by that Act, be subject to subsequent 
Ministerial override, and the UK Government has provided 
in the Act that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is not 
retained in UK law. It is also worthy of note, that although 
the current administration may promise to retain EU legal 
standards, future administrations will be under no obligation 
to do so and equality and employment-related rights derived 
from EU law may be eroded over time.
12 As per paragraph four of the section entitled ‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity’ in the 1998 
Agreement.
13 The proposed Bill of Rights was presented by the Northern Ireland Human Rights to the Northern Ireland 
Office in 2008. The Northern Ireland Office rejected the proposed Bill on 30 November 2009 citing various 
reasons for the decision, including the perceived controversial inclusion of socio-economic rights, Northern 
Ireland Office Consultation Paper, ‘A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, Next Steps’, November 2009
14 Commission on a Bill of Rights, a UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us, Volume 1 (December 2012) para.8.28 
15 NIHRC, ‘A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Next Steps Response to the Northern Ireland Office’, February 
2010, 39.
16 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘The Good Friday Agreement, Role of Human Rights in Peace Agreements’, International 
Council on Human Rights Policy, Review Meeting, Belfast March 7-8 2005, International Council on Human 
Rights Policy, para.45
17 House of Commons, Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: an Interim 
statement, Sixth Report of Session 2009-10, Report together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence, 15 
March 2010, (NIAC Report), Evidence Briefing, Ms Ann Hope, Commissioner, Ev1.
18 Brice Dickson, House of Commons, Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: 
an Interim statement, Sixth Report of Session 2009-10, Report together with formal minutes, oral and written 
evidence, 15 March 2010, (NIAC Report) <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/
cmselect/cmniaf/236/236.pdf> para.12.
19 Lady Trimble, Oral Evidence, NIAC Report ibid, Ev.15
20 Stephen Pound (MP), Oral Questioning, NIAC Report ibid, Ev.3
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We also need to take into account, in this context, the specific 
reference to the need for the Ad Hoc Assembly Committee 
agreed in New Decade, New Approach of 2020 to consider 
the impact of Brexit on rights protection. In order to identify 
the types of measures that may be considered necessary, as 
a result of the UK leaving the EU, it is useful to identify the 
different threats to existing levels of ESR as a result of exiting 
the EU. There are at least four.
The first difficulty for ESR protections from Brexit is that 
the existing EU-regulated single market system, one 
relatively sympathetic to ESR will need to be replaced with 
something different and, potentially, less sympathetic to 
these requirements. The UK’s stated aims post Brexit include 
reaching extensive trade and investment agreements with 
states other than the EU, such as the United State. The question 
that will arise in this context is what conditions the other 
states with which the UK wishes to conclude an agreement 
require. The principal issue is often not the question of tariff 
barriers, but non-tariff barriers, which include potentially 
regulatory standards in the UK that the other state considers a 
barrier to entry. Examples would include regulatory standards 
such as restricting hormones in beef, but it could equally 
include some types of ESR standards.
A second problem associated with leaving the EU, would be 
how to ensure, if this is what is considered necessary, that the 
UK remains in step with the EU’s post-Brexit ESR reforms and 
interpretation, assuming it remains a progressive force.
The third difficulty relates to the ECHR. A significant layer 
of ESR protection in the UK now derives from the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and the ECHR. Brexit will remove a significant 
political requirement for UK to continue as member of ECHR, 
and there is therefore a possible threat to Human Rights Act 
1998 in future, and possible withdrawal of the UK from ECHR 
to be contemplated.
The fourth relates to the methods of protection and the 
remedy that EU law provided. More fundamentally, leaving 
the EU impacts on the remedies available for the enforcement 
of ESR, in particular the extent to which human rights 
obligations override conflicting Parliamentary legislation. 
In particular, because of the supremacy of EU law, national 
law was prevented from reducing ESR protection below EU 
standards. In this respect, the remedies available under EU 
law for a breach of equality law, for example, could be much 
further reaching than the remedies now available under the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Act 1998, and 
the Equality Act 2010. For example, in the Benkharbouche 
case, Ms Benkharbouche and Ms Janah were employed by 
the Sudanese and Libyan Embassies in London. They were 
dismissed and brought claims against the Embassies for unfair 
dismissal, failure to pay the national minimum wage and 
breach of the Working Time Regulations 1998. Ms Jannah also 
claimed racial discrimination and harassment. The Embassies 
sought to claim immunity under the State Immunity Act 1961 – 
primary legislation which seeks to exclude foreign embassies 
from domestic rules regarding employment. The Court of 
Appeal in England found that, amongst other issues, there 
had been a breach of the Working Time Regulations and anti-
discrimination law which fell within the scope of EU law.21 The 
UK State Immunity Act 1961 was disapplied in order to grant 
the applicants an effective remedy. The Supreme Court upheld 
the Court of Appeal’s decision.22
This case, and the remedy granted, represents the most 
robust form of remedy that can be employed by a UK court 
when dealing with primary legislation that conflicts with EU 
law – including EU human rights and equality provisions. 
As explained in the Miller judgment, the process of exiting 
the European Union has meant that remedies such as this 
will be lost when the UK leaves,23 and the Withdrawal Act 
1998 recognises this. The one major exception to this relates 
to the rights protected by Article 2 of the Ireland-Northern 
Ireland Protocol. If the removal of supra-national guarantees, 
which are currently not subject to override by Parliamentary 
sovereignty on a day to day basis, is considered a problem, 
then the remedy is to attempt to substitute other supra-
national guarantees which would also function as a barrier to 
Parliament or the local Assembly reducing ESR guarantees.
There is a further uncertainty which will affect the status of 
ESR protections. After Brexit, existing areas of EU competence 
will be repatriated to the UK, but there is still considerable 
uncertainty as to which of these competences will be allocated 
to Westminster/Whitehall, and which to the devolved 
governments across the UK. It is unclear, in particular, who 
will be responsible for many of the EU competences which 
engage socio-economic rights. It is also unclear to what 
extent such competences that are devolved will become the 
responsibility of the Northern Ireland Assembly or will fall 
within executive competence. In light of these various and 
varying factors, we develop a fifth model of enforcement that 
might be developed to protect ESR rights that were previously 
derived from EU law. 
(k) Continuing political negotiations
The lack of consensus on a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights 
amongst the political parties mentioned above continues to 
dog the Bill of Rights process, but there are indications of some 
movement (to put the point as cautiously as possible). Between 
January 2017 and January 2020, no Northern Ireland Executive 
was in operation. During that period, there were periodic sets of 
negotiations between the parties on the restoration of a power-
sharing government. These culminated in New Decade, New 
Approach (‘NDNA’).24 This provides for the establishment of an 
ad hoc Northern Ireland Assembly Committee, the role of which 
is ‘to consider the creation of a Bill of Rights that is faithful to the 
stated intention of the 1998 Agreement in that it contains rights 
supplementary to those contained in the European Convention 
on Human Rights (which are currently applicable) and “that 
reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland”; as well 
as reflecting the principles of mutual respect for the identity and 
ethos of both communities and parity of esteem.’25
Annex E of NDNA, provides that the Ad-Hoc Committee will be 
assisted in its work by a Panel of five experts appointed jointly by 
the First Minister and deputy First Minister.26 The role of the Panel 
is ‘initially [to] seek to advise the Ad-Hoc Committee on what 
constitutes our “particular circumstances” drawing upon, but not 
bound by, previous work on a Bill of Rights and [to] review and 
make recommendations on how the UK’s withdrawal from the 
EU may impact on our “particular circumstances”.’27 How far this 
new process will move beyond the previous stalemate remains 
uncertain.28 NDNA notes that: ‘The establishment of cross party 
and cross community support will be critical to advancing a Bill 
of Rights.’29
(l) Covid-19
As we were nearing the completion of this Report, the Covid-19 
global pandemic struck, with massive implications for work, 
health, welfare, freedom of movement, privacy, and social life.  
As of September 2020, it would seem that the limitations in  
how governments have managed the pandemic has focused  
renewed attention on issues such as the structure of work, the 
funding of the National Health Service, and economic and  
health inequalities between communities, among others. All of 
these issues are closely linked to the issue of ESR. It remains to  
be seen whether the medium to long term effect of the 
pandemic will be increased intensity of appeals for such rights 
to be better protected, and acceptance by government that such 
calls are justified.
21 Benkharbouche v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2017] UKSC 62. See also 
Google Inc v. Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311 for a similar remedy in the disapplication of primary UK law 
contrary to EU law. The UK law was also declared to be incompatible with the ECHR in Benkharbouche.
22 Note that the Court of Appeal also employed Article 47 of the Charter and the right to an effective remedy.
23 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, para.78
24 New Decade, New Approach (January 2020).
25 NDNA, para 28.
26 NDNA, para 5.27.
27 NDNA, para 5.28.
28 See https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/advancing-a-bill-of-rights-for-northern-ireland/.
29 NDNA, para 5.29.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we have sought to identify what appear to us to 
be the main contextual factors that our Report needs to take into 
account. In the remainder of this Report, we suggest five main 
models that we consider are worth considering, taking these 
contextual factors into account. We suggest that the models 
identified are responsive to these key contextual considerations. 
They are also, as was requested of us:
• innovative and creative;
• situated on the spectrum between full justiciability of subjective 
rights and simply declaratory, tending towards the middle of that 
spectrum;
• feasible within the institutional and constitutional features of 
Northern Ireland government and administration, as established 
by the Northern Ireland Act 1998, implementing the Belfast-Good 
Friday Agreement and subsequent agreements; and
• provide an opportunity to engage local politicians in further 
debate.
We reiterate, however, that we do not reject the earlier proposals 
made by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 
(considered further below), nor do we reject any more extensive 
constitutional or legislative reforms; these are already in the public 
domain.30 Our brief was to introduce into Northern Ireland public 
debate other approaches that fall short of these.
We have also made clear, at the beginning of this chapter, that 
the current rapid changes that are underway politically and 
economically make it difficult to assess the effect, let alone the 
utility, of several of the models described. Thus, for example, 
current uncertainties surrounding the outcome of the current 
future relations negotiations between the EU and the UK make the 
fifth model difficult to assess; the extent of political scepticism over 
the role of judicial review in certain sections of the popular press 
and political commentaries make the feasibility of the fourth model 
questionable. The first, second and third options will be affected 
by how far there are significant changes in the scope of devolved 
powers. In several respects, therefore, this is not an auspicious 
time in which to consider options. On the other hand, the Covid-19 
pandemic has exacerbated already existing problems in accessing 
ESR, and the effect has been to make addressing ESR now even 
more timely. What we aim to provide in the following chapters, 
then, is a set of options that we hope will stimulate a much-needed 
debate in Northern Ireland about how ESR are to be addressed in 
the future, rather than an immediate blueprint.
30 See, in particular, Anne Smith and Colin Harvey, Where Next for a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland (Ulster University/Queen’s University Belfast, 2018)
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AND RELEVANT CODES 
OF PRACTICE
This chapter focuses on developing a model 
that seeks to enhance the enforcement of 
economic and social rights (ESR) in Northern 
Ireland by ensuring that careful attention 
is given to the international obligation to 
protect, respect and fulfil such rights at 
times when new legislation or policies are 
being planned and debated. It considers 
the feasibility of mechanisms designed to 
increase the regard which Ministers in the 
Northern Ireland Executive, other Members 
of the Northern Ireland Assembly and civil 
servants in Northern Ireland government 
departments must all pay to ESR whenever 
they are proposing or developing new laws 
and policies.
The mechanisms in question are (1) Assembly Committees, (2) 
Assembly Standing Orders and (3) Ministerial Codes. In each 
case the mechanisms could be employed without the need for 
any new legislation to reinforce them, but if such legislation 
were to be passed it would allow the mechanisms to be 
strengthened so that they would be more likely to operate 
effectively in upholding ESR. This section looks first at each 
of the three types of mechanisms before going on to examine 
how they could be made to work more effectively if legislation 
were enacted to that end. The section proceeds on the 
assumption that the NIA will continue, and that an Executive 
will continue to operate.
(1) Assembly Committees
Statutory and Standing Committees
At present Members of the Assembly scrutinise proposed 
legislation and existing or proposed policies through various 
Committees. These are called Statutory Committees because 
their existence is mandated through legislation (section 29 of 
the Northern Ireland Act 1998). They have to advise and assist 
each Northern Ireland Minister ‘in the formulation of policy 
with respect to matters within his [or her] responsibilities 
as a Minister’. They can also initiate legislation, although this 
happens very rarely. An example is the Assembly Members 
(Independent Financial Review and Standards) Act (NI) 2011, 
which provided for an independent panel to be set up to 
determine the salaries and allowances of MLAs and for an 
Assembly Commissioner for Standards to be created to ensure 
independent investigations of complaints against MLAs.
Statutory Committees must carry out the tasks listed in 
paragraph 9 of Strand One of the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement, which are as follows:
• consider and advise on departmental budgets and Annual 
Plans in the context of the overall budget allocation
• approve relevant secondary legislation and take the 
Committee stage of relevant primary legislation
• call for persons and papers
• initiate enquiries and make reports
• consider and advise on matters brought to the Committee by 
its Minister.
As there are currently (during the 2017-2022 mandate) nine 
departments within the Northern Ireland Executive, there are 
nine statutory committees dealing with:









Under the Assembly’s Standing Orders, the Assembly must 
establish Committees not only to discharge duties in relation 
to departments but also to ‘carry out any other functions 
deemed necessary’. There are currently (during the 2017-2022 
mandate) seven of these so-called ‘Standing’ Committees. They 
are:
• Assembly and Executive Review
• Audit
• Business Committee
• Chairpersons’ Liaison Group
• Procedures
• Public Accounts
• Standards and Privileges
Like the Statutory Committees, these Standing Committees 
have the power to send for persons and papers. Committees 
can also sit together, or the Assembly can decide to create a 
specific Joint Committee.1
Special or Ad Hoc Committees
There is no Committee whose sole function is to consider 
proposed legislation, or existing or proposed polices, from 
an equality and/or human rights perspective.2 Paragraph 11 of 
Strand One of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement provided 
that the Assembly could appoint a special Committee ‘to 
examine and report on whether a measure or proposal 
for legislation is in conformity with equality requirements, 
including the ECHR/Bill of Rights’. The procedure for setting 
up and operating such a special Committee (called an Ad Hoc 
Committee on Conformity with Equality Requirements) has 
since been provided for at some length in Assembly Standing 
Order 35.
In practice, the establishment of this kind of special 
Committee is relatively rare. In 2012-13, during the Assembly’s 
consideration of the proposed Welfare Reform Bill, an Ad Hoc 
Committee was established ‘in order to consider only and 
report only on whether the provisions of the Welfare Reform 
Bill are in conformity with the requirements for equality and 
observance of human rights’. The Committee debated the 
content of its report on 14 January 20133 and the report was 
published on 21 January 2013.4 The Committee could not 
identify any specific breaches of equality or human rights 
in the Welfare Reform Bill. The report was debated in the 
Assembly on 29 January 2013,5 where on a cross-community 
vote (53 v 38) it was not approved. Unionist MLAs were in 
favour of the report, as were the Alliance MLAs; but nationalist 
MLAs were against it, as was the Green MLA.6 The report was 
discussed again the following day by the Committee for Social 
Development,7 whose consideration of the Welfare Reform 
Bill had been put on hold pending the conclusion of the Ad 
Hoc Committee’s work.
In addition to the special Committee provided for in the 
Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, Assembly Standing Order 
53(1) states that ‘ad hoc committees shall be established 
from time to time to deal with any specific time-bounded 
terms of reference that the Assembly may set. The Assembly 
shall decide the membership of any such committee and 
may direct its method of operation’. There are currently two 
Ad Hoc Committees sitting: the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Covid-19 Response; and the Ad Hoc Committee on the Bill 
or Rights. It would be possible for the Assembly to create 
such a committee for the specific purpose of monitoring the 
compatibility of legislation and policy with ESR.
1 Assembly Standing Order 64C. For information on Assembly Committees more generally, but bearing in 
mind that the number of Statutory Committees has fallen since 2013, see: http://education.niassembly.gov.
uk/sites/userfiles/files/MAY2013FinalCommittees(2).pdf.
2 See, generally, Ray McCaffrey and Fiona O’Connell, Standing Committees that examine conformity 
with human rights and equality issues in legislatures in the UK and Ireland, NI Assembly, Research and 
Information Service Briefing Paper 001/14 (January 2014).
3 See http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/official-reports/ad-hoc/ad-
hoc-2012-13/130114_agreementoncommitteeposition.pdf.
4 For the Executive Summary see http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-business/
committees/2011-2016/ad-hoc-committee-on-conformity-with-equality-requirements-welfare-reform-
bill/reports/report-on-whether-the-provisions-of-the-welfare-reform-bill-are-in-conformity-with-
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Analysis
There are several arguments in favour of establishing a 
Committee to consider ESC in Northern Ireland, either 
as a stand-alone committee or as part of the mandate of 
a committee with a broader mandate. First, the Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission recommended in 2001 
that the Assembly should have its own Standing Committee 
on Human Rights and Equality,8 a recommendation repeated 
in the Commission’s 2008 advice to the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland on a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland.9 Second, there is a precedent in the form of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights at Westminster, which has had 
some marked success in establishing itself as a powerful and 
effective voice for human rights. Third, having a forum for the 
expression of alternative views on rights may be thought to 
be intrinsically helpful, by bringing these disputes within the 
devolved institutions, rather than outside these institutions. 
Notably a new Equality and Human Rights Committee was 
established in the Scottish Parliament. Although it is too early 
to determine the effectiveness of this Committee in this regard 
it will be of interest to Northern Ireland to note its progress.10 
Similarly, the Welsh Parliament’s Equality, Local Government 
and Communities Committee includes both equality and 
human rights within its remit. Each of these Committees 
whilst routinely considering human rights does not explicitly 
include ESR within its remit.
On the other hand, the experience of setting up an Ad 
Hoc Committee on Equality was not a very harmonious or 
fruitful one. It served to bring out the deep divisions which 
exist within the Assembly, largely between the unionist and 
nationalist positions, around what constitutes a breach of 
equality or human rights standards. The chances of a new 
Standing Committee on Equality and Human Rights being 
able, at least at the moment, to adopt an agreed stance on 
whether proposed new legislation breaches international 
standards are therefore slim, the more so if the remit of the 
Committee is confined to ESR. This would be the case whether 
the Committee was a special Committee envisaged by the 
Agreement and regulated by Standing Order 35 or an ad hoc 
Committee set up under Standing Order 53(1).
A further practical difficulty with creating any such Committee 
is that in 2016 the number of MLAs was reduced from 108 to 
90. This makes it harder to populate committees with a critical 
mass of MLAs who have the time to take their Committee 
responsibilities sufficiently seriously. Currently each of the 
Standing and Statutory Committees is required to have 9 
members,11 including the chairperson and deputy chairperson. 
Given that Ministers do not sit on Committees, most non-
ministerial MLAs sit on two Committees, and some on three.
There could be other difficulties in setting up an Assembly 
Committee with the specific function of scrutinising Bills 
to check that they comply with international standards on 
ESR. If the example set by the Ad Hoc Committee on Equality 
were to be followed, discussion of the Bills by other Standing 
Committees would often need to be suspended while the ESR 
Committee completed its scrutiny. Even if this suspension 
of activities could be avoided, how it could be ensured that 
discussions within the ESR Committee would not be repeated 
at the relevant Standing Committee charged with looking 
at the Bill, or vice-versa, would need to be considered. It is 
true that Assembly Standing Orders 64, 64A and 64B attempt 
to regulate such problems, but even getting agreement on 
how such regulation should be applied in practice might be 
difficult.
It also may not be wise to corral debate about ESR into 
one specific Committee rather than seek to mainstream 
consideration of ESR rights throughout all Standing 
Committees. Some might point to the work of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights at Westminster as a good 
example of how a specific Committee can influence 
government departments on rights and equality issues, 
but the context within which that Committee functions is 
significantly different from that which obtains at Stormont: 
the 12 members of the JCHR represent a total of 650 MPs and 
approximately 800 peers, there are no cross-community 
voting requirements and the resources available to service 
the Committee are significantly greater than at Stormont, 
including a full-time advisor who is an acknowledged 
legal specialist in the field. Moreover, the Joint Committee 
traditionally has members who have already devoted many 
years of active work on human rights or equality issues and 
can be considered genuine experts. It has a broader remit, too, 
in that it can conduct inquiries into human rights issues. There 
is also a culture whereby government departments issue 
formal responses to reports of committees at Westminster, a 
practice which does not seem to be replicated on a systematic 
basis at Stormont.
An assessment of whether the establishment of a Committee 
would be helpful depends, substantially, on what function 
such a Committee is intended to serve. If the function is 
to provide an opportunity to discuss ESR on a continuing 
basis, without necessarily reaching agreement, then that is 
achievable. If the function of the Committee is expected to be 
reaching agreement on the meaning and effect of such rights 
in the domestic context in Northern Ireland, so as to provide 
an agreed standard by which proposed legislation is assessed, 
that is less likely.
Then again, if the function is to affect the drafting of 
legislation, there may be other methods of achieving this 
short of establishing a Committee. When civil servants in 
each government department are considering new legislation 
and policies they already follow detailed guidance to ensure 
that they comply with the Human Rights Act 1998. It would 
be a relatively small step to provide those civil servants with 
additional guidance on how to ensure compliance with 
international standards on ESR, even if such ESR have not 
been expressly incorporated into domestic law in the way 
that the ECHR incorporates Convention rights. Besides some 
of the Convention rights partially overlap with international-
recognised ESR, such as the right to respect for one’s home 
(Article 8) and the right to education (Article 2 of Protocol 1). 
Even if no changes at all were made to current arrangements 
for Assembly Committees and MLAs to consider ESR, making 
such guidance available to, or accessible by, civil servants 
might indirectly achieve that goal.
(2) Assembly Standing Orders12
Whether or not a specific Committee is established within 
the Assembly to consider ESR, which would itself require, at 
the very least, an amendment to Assembly Standing Orders, 
it might be possible to advance a non-legislative approach to 
the safeguarding of ESR through imposing more responsibility 
directly on Ministers and thereby indirectly on civil servants 
to bear in mind ESR when they are devising and developing 
new laws and policies. Under section 9 of the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998, a Minister in charge of a Bill must, on or before 
its introduction in the Assembly, issue a statement to the 
effect that in his or her view the Bill is within the legislative 
competence of the Assembly,13 and section 6 of the same Act 
makes it clear that to be within that legislative competence 
the Bill must not be incompatible with any of the Convention 
rights (defined by section 98 as meaning the same as in the 
Human Rights Act 1998). At Westminster, because it is a 
sovereign and not a subordinate Parliament, under section 
19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 a Minister in charge of a Bill 
has the option of making a statement to the effect that he or 
8 The Northern Ireland Assembly’s Standing Orders and Human Rights Protection.
9 A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, p 170.
10 Not least because the Committee plans to extend its remit further to include engagement with 
international human rights following the recommendations of a report into the role of the Parliament 
as a guarantor of human rights, Scottish Parliament Equality and Human Rights Committee, “Getting 
Rights Right: Human Rights and the Scottish Parliament”, November 2018, available at https://sp-bpr-
en-prod-cdnep.azureedge.net/published/EHRiC/2018/11/26/Getting-Rights-Right--Human-Rights-
and-the-Scottish-Parliament-3/EHRiCS052018R6Rev.pdf.
11 Assembly Standing Orders 49(2)(a) and 52(2)(a).
12 The latest version of the Standing Orders, dated March 2020, is available here:
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/standing-orders/so-31march2020-updates.
pdf.
13 Assembly Standing Order 84 places a similar duty on the promoter of a Private Members Bill.
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she is unable to confirm the Bill’s compatibility with Convention 
rights but that the government nevertheless wishes the House to 
proceed with it.
It would be possible for the Assembly to adopt a new Standing 
Order requiring a Minister in charge of a Bill to state whether 
in his or her view the Bill is or is not compatible with the 
duties to protect ESR which the United Kingdom has agreed to 
through the ratification of international treaties. This would at 
least focus the Minister’s mind and those of his or her officials 
on the potential impact of the Bill on ESR. The Standing Order 
could go on to require the Minister to state why, in cases 
where he or she is not able to say that the Bill is compatible 
with ESR, the government department still wishes to proceed 
with it. Given the inherent uncertainty around what some ESR 
actually require of states, this procedure would at least bring 
to the fore the points on which disagreement exists. In turn, 
it would facilitate discussion of those points when the Bill 
is being debated in the Assembly, a point that could also be 
made regarding a possible Committee.
This is what occurred when, at Westminster, the government 
felt unable to issue a statement that the Communications Bill 
it was introducing in 2002 was compatible with Convention 
rights as far as the control of political advertising was 
concerned. When the Bill was debated in Parliament a lot 
of attention was paid to that very matter and, years later, 
when the ECHR-compatibility of sections 319 and 321 of the 
resulting Communications Act 2003 was considered by the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, 
emphasis was placed by that Court on the thoroughness of 
the parliamentary debate at Westminster when it reached 
the conclusion that the United Kingdom had acted within its 
margin of appreciation in enacting those provisions.14
Assembly Standing Orders could also be amended to 
harmonise procedures concerning human rights issues and 
equality issues affecting proposed legislation. At present 
Standing Orders 34 and 35 differ significantly, with only the 
latter allowing for the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee of 
the Assembly. On the other hand, Order 35 does not allow 
for advice to be sought from the Equality Commission 
for Northern Ireland (ECNI) even though Order 34 is built 
around asking for advice from the Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission (NIHRC). To some extent this difference 
is explicable by the terms of paragraph 11 of Strand One of 
the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, as mentioned above, 
but it would be within the powers of the Assembly to alter 
the Standing Orders so as to direct the attention of the Ad 
Hoc Committee to ESR and require it to take into account 
the views expressed by both the ECNI and the NIHRC on the 
compatibility of the Bill in question with all the international 
standards on ESR to which the United Kingdom has agreed 
to abide.
Assembly Standing Order 41 requires that when Bills are 
introduced in the Assembly they must be accompanied 
by an explanatory and financial memorandum. It does not 
specify that the memorandum should set out why the Bill is 
compatible with Convention rights even though in practice 
most memoranda do say something about human rights. 
As pointed out in a briefing paper commissioned by the 
Assembly itself in 2014, the guidance on what should be 
included in explanatory memoranda at Westminster is more 
demanding on human rights compliance than what is usually 
expected in Northern Ireland,15 so here too there is scope for 
amending the Assembly Standing Orders accordingly.
(3) Ministerial Codes
Ministers in Northern Ireland are also obliged to abide by 
three separate documents setting out particular standards. 
First, under sections 16, 18 and 19 of the Northern Ireland Act 
1998 they must affirm the terms of a Pledge of Office, the most 
pertinent of which is probably paragraph (c), which requires 
Ministers ‘to serve all the people of Northern Ireland equally, 
and to act in accordance with the general obligations on 
government to promote equality and prevent discrimination’. 
Second, they must comply with a Ministerial Code of 
Conduct, paragraph (vi) of which requires them to ‘operate 
in a way conducive to promoting good community relations 
and equality of treatment’. Third, and this is reinforced by 
paragraph (iv) of the Ministerial Code of Conduct, Ministers 
must follow the seven principles of public life, first drawn up 
by the former senior judge, Lord Nolan, in 1995.
The first two of the three documents just mentioned were 
set out in Annex A to Strand One of the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement and were reproduced in Schedule 4 to the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998. They now form part of a larger 
document called, confusingly, the Ministerial Code, which sets 
out additional matters relevant to the exercise of executive 
power in Northern Ireland.16 The Code itself provides, in 
paragraph 4, that it cannot be amended unless and until 
the proposed amendment is approved by the Assembly 
with cross-community support. It could be amended, for 
example, to require Ministers, when they are exercising 
their functions, to pay due regard to the United Kingdom’s 
obligations to protect ESR. This would be comparable to, 
though less enforceable than, the duties imposed upon 
Ministers (and other public authorities) by section 75(1) of 
the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which focuses on the need to 
promote equality of opportunity between different sectional 
groups depending, for example, on their religious belief, 
racial background, gender or disability status. Depending 
on the strength of the wording of the amended Code it is 
possible that the High Court would be willing to consider 
an application for judicial review if there was evidence that 
a Minister had clearly not paid due regard to ESR when 
exercising his or her functions.
Ministers in Northern Ireland must also bear in mind that 
if they do take any action which fails to meet the United 
Kingdom’s international obligations – including those 
imposed by human rights treaties – they remain in danger of 
having their actions countermanded by the Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland. Section 26(3) of the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998 expressly states that this power applies even where 
the action concerned consists of introducing a Bill in the 
Assembly or making subordinate legislation. The Secretary of 
State’s power is exercisable through the making of an order, 
which can have retrospective effect (section 26(5)), but the 
order is subject to annulment by a resolution of either House 
of Parliament (section 96(1)). The power has not to date been 
exercised, and there would doubtless be serious political 
ramifications if it ever were to be, but it is still a significant 
weapon in the national government’s armoury if it were faced 
with obvious and blatant violations of ESR by a Northern 
Ireland Minister.
Under this heading on Ministerial Codes we should also 
mention the idea that a Code could impose obligations on 
Ministers to consider ESR when they are taking decisions on 
what their spending will be in any financial year. Substantial 
work on how public spending can be monitored from a 
human rights point of view has already been undertaken by 
researchers based in Northern Ireland.17
It would be perfectly possible for the Ministerial Code to be 
amended so as to require Ministers to, at the very least, take 
into account international standards on ESR when drawing 
up and implementing budgets. One of those standards, of 
course, is the obligation on each state to ‘take steps…to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights recognized [in 
14 Animal Defenders International v UK, 22 April 2013, paras 108 and 113-123. The Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords had also given great weight to this factor when deciding (by 5 v 0) that the relevant section of 
the 2003 Act was compatible with Convention Rights: R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State 
for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15, [2008] 1 AC 1312, e.g. [33], per Lord Bingham.
15 Tim Moore, Michael Potter and Jane Campbell, Human Rights and Equality Proofing of Public Bills, NI 
Assembly, Research and Information Service Briefing Paper 20/14 (10 February 2014).
16 The Ministerial Code can be accessed here: https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/sites/default/files/
publications/nigov/Northern%20Ireland%20Ministerial%20Code.pdf. It was drawn up as a result of St 
Andrews Agreement in 2006 and is provided for by section 28A of the Northern Ireland Act, which was 
inserted into the 1998 Act by section 5 of the Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006.
17 See, for example, Aoife Nolan, Rory O’Connell and Colin Harvey (eds), Human Rights and Public Finance: 
Budgets and the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights (Hart Publishing, 2013).
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the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (the ICESCR)] by all appropriate means’.18 To supplement 
such a reform, the Assembly’s Standing Orders for the Public 
Accounts Committee could be amended to require it to 
assess whether public money has been spent in ways which 
do not violate international standards on ESR. Of course, as 
evidenced by the experience of the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Welfare Reform Bill, discussed above, there is considerable 
room for reasonable people to disagree on what would or 
would not amount to a violation of those standards. To give 
an obvious example, do the words ‘achieve progressively 
the full realisation of rights’ mean that there must be better 
protection of each economic and social right on a year-to-year 
basis, or can they mean that it is enough if, over the period of 
a reporting cycle of, say, five years, economic and social rights 
are better protected at the end of the period than they were at 
the start?
(4) Legislative options
The international standard in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, when 
referring to ‘all appropriate means’, continues: ‘including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures’. Each of 
the three mechanisms already discussed in this chapter 
– Assembly Committees, Assembly Standing Orders and 
Ministerial Codes – could be applied as they currently stand 
in ways which would enhance the enforcement of ESR in 
Northern Ireland by ensuring that greater pre-legislative 
attention is given to relevant international obligations. Thus, 
the Assembly itself could decide to set up a new Committee, 
it could also alter its own Standing Orders or the Ministerial 
Code, and the Pledge of Office and Standards of Public Life 
could each be interpreted in ways which would require 
Ministers to pay more heed to ESR.
It is obvious, however, that more entrenched protection 
could be accorded to ESR if legislation were passed to cement 
such changes and/or to confer upon the Assembly additional 
powers and duties in relation to ESR. The example set by 
section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 should be borne in 
mind in this context (see the discussion of Model 2 below).
It is also worth noting that the function of ‘observing and 
implementing international obligations’, including the ECHR 
and the Protocols thereto which the United Kingdom has 
ratified,19 is specifically excluded from the definition of an 
‘excepted matter’ under the Northern Ireland Act 1998.20 The 
function is also not included in the category of ‘reserved 
matters’, all of which are, potentially, only temporarily withheld 
from the Northern Ireland Assembly.21 It therefore has to be 
considered as a ‘transferred matter’.22 This means that it is 
already within the competence of the Assembly to pass laws 
which observe or implement international obligations such as 
those in the United Nations’ ICESCR or the Council of Europe’s 
Social Charter (not to mention Title IV of the EU’s Charter 
of Fundamental Rights in relation to the implementation of 
EU law, for so long as that law continues to be applicable in 
Northern Ireland). This could occur even if other parts of the 
United Kingdom did not follow suit.
A comparable situation arises in Scotland.23 That is why the 
Scottish Parliament was able to enact Part I of the Children and 
Young People (Scotland) Act 2014, which imposes duties on 
Scottish Ministers and other public authorities in relation to 
compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and, more recently, to introduce the UNCRC Incorporation 
(Scotland) Bill 2020. Indeed in the Commissioner for Older 
People Act (NI) 2011 the Northern Ireland Assembly has already 
provided that in deciding how to exercise his or her functions 
the Commissioner must ‘have regard to the United Nations 
Principles for Older Persons adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations on 16 December 1991’.24 Consensus on 
including that provision seems to have been reached fairly 
easily amongst MLAs, but whether that would be the case if a 
broader duty to have regard to the ICESCR were to be imposed 
on all Ministers is very much a moot point.
18 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. 
19 This embraces a wider set of rights than the ‘Convention rights’ as defined in the Human Rights Act 1998.
20 Sch 2, para 3(c).
21 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Sch 3.
22 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 4(1).
23 Scotland Act 1998, Sch 5, para 7.
24 Section 2(3)(b).
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This chapter outlines a model for economic 
and social rights (ESR) enforcement in 
Northern Ireland available within the 
existing constitutional framework that 
focuses on socio-economic requirements 
in specific legislation. As we shall see, there 
is a variety of different approaches within 
this broad model, with different approaches 
having both strengths and weaknesses. 
These are broadly contextualised within 
the particular circumstances of Northern 
Ireland, including the political impasse in 
terms of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
and the impact of constitutional change such 
as that entailed by Brexit.
This chapter examines the potential for ESR enforcement by 
enhancing existing equality legislation in Northern Ireland. 
The chapter also considers the approach of introducing a 
legislative regime that draws upon international ESR treaties, 
exploring the option of a ‘due regard’ duty, as well as full 
incorporation. Finally, the chapter addresses the option of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly enacting specific legislation to 
provide for socio-economic rights to operate within its area of 
devolved competence.
(1) Enhancing equality legislation in Northern Ireland
Economic and social rights can often be indirectly protected 
as a result of the enforcement of non-discrimination 
measures, where equality legislation acts as a vehicle for the 
protection of economic and social rights. This pattern has 
been recognised in both the literature,1 and can be evidenced 
in practice.2 Here, we consider the scope of enhancing existing 
equality provisions in Northern Ireland. Whilst this model 
may offer increased protection for ESR it should be noted that 
the protection afforded to ESR under the rubric of equality 
provisions can be both piecemeal and incremental. Equality 
provisions are also often designed to offer procedural rather 
than substantive protection.
Equality law in Northern Ireland consists of a series of specific 
legislative measures and is underpinned by the equality 
provisions found in the Northern Ireland Act 1998.3 In the rest 
of the UK, the bulk of equality provisions are consolidated in 
one piece of legislation – the Equality Act 2010 (which does 
not extend to Northern Ireland). The Northern Ireland equality 
regime operates, therefore, under a different legislative 
scheme from other parts of the UK and this has an impact on 
the enforcement of economic and social rights.
Here we raise three possible approaches to enhancing existing 
equality mechanisms in Northern Ireland, in order to better 
protect socio-economic rights:
• First, we consider extending equality law, drawing lessons 
from the broader GB experience. This analysis includes 
considering the consolidation of all the different legislative 
mechanisms under one Act.
• Second, we consider an enhanced form of remedy by making 
the public sector equality duty under section 75 of the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998 amenable to judicial review so that 
compliance can be tested in the courts.
• Third, we consider whether section 75 should be amended 
to include a ground for discrimination based on socio-
economic disadvantage.
Whilst equality law is to a large extent devolved in Northern 
Ireland, any change to section 75 of the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998 would require legislation from Westminster.4 We 
would emphasise that any changes to the Northern Ireland 
framework should build on and not replace the already 
established best practice that exists in Northern Ireland – 
including, for example, the obligation on public authorities 
to produce, publish and review equality schemes under 
Schedule 9 to the 1998 Act, and the duty to mitigate identified 
adverse effects.5 Enhanced equality provisions, drawing on 
GB experience, should not come at the expense of existing 
Northern Ireland mechanisms.
Harmonising, simplifying and strengthening existing 
equality law
The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland has 
recommended that equality law in Northern Ireland should be 
harmonised, simplified and strengthened.6 In 2014 the
Commission issued a report identifying equality law gaps 
between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. The report 
identifies that Northern Ireland equality law contains ‘a 
number of unjustifiable exceptions which limit the scope of 
the equality legislation, as well as unnecessary barriers that 
limit individuals’ ability to exercise their rights under the 
legislation.’7 The ECNI highlighted that the failure to keep pace 
with new and emerging forms of discrimination may leave 
individuals with limited or no protection against unlawful 
discrimination.8 The range of gaps in equality law between 
NI and GB may impact on vulnerable and marginalised 
individuals who experience discrimination and who have less 
protection against unlawful discrimination, harassment and 
victimisation across a number of equality grounds.9
As discussed above, gaps in anti-discrimination law can 
impact on the enjoyment of socio-economic rights. For 
example, in the submission to the UN Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (February 2017) both the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Equality 
Commission for Northern Ireland identified concerns for 
disabled people who have less protection in Northern Ireland 
than in the rest of the UK in terms of access to remedies 
against perceived and associative discrimination and indirect 
discrimination.10 The Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has also 
highlighted that the political climate in NI has prevented 
progress on equality reform and that this has meant those 
from national minorities also fall between equality ‘gaps’.11 
The main areas identified for immediate reform by the ECNI 
include race equality legislation, disability legislation, and age 
discrimination legislation relating to the provision of goods 
and services.12
Recommendations have been made to follow the GB example 
and consolidate all legislative instruments in Northern 
Ireland into one overarching piece of legislation in order to 
provide greater clarity and strengthen existing protections 
(similar to the Equality Act 2010).13 An immediate step towards 
mainstreaming socio-economic rights enforcement would 
therefore be to extend the scope of equality law to ensure that 
those living in Northern Ireland have access to the same rights 
and remedies as is available for individuals in GB – possibly 
through an Equality Act for Northern Ireland. The Northern 
Ireland Assembly has the devolved power to legislate to 
improve and strength equality provisions in devolved 
areas on a piecemeal basis. However, as noted above, any 
change to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the overarching 
equality framework would require Westminster legislation. 
As previously stated, whilst lessons may be learned from the 
broader GB experience, this should not be at the expense of 
existing mechanisms in the Northern Ireland framework.
Strengthening equality provisions in Northern Ireland has 
become all the more pertinent in the light of Brexit. In some 
1 Nolan et al The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal (Human Rights Consortium March 
2007) para.3.3.1. Nolan et al state ‘The relationship between the right to equality and non-discrimination and social and 
economic rights is of central importance to the adjudication of social and economic rights. Violations of most social 
and economic rights are directly linked to systemic inequalities and may, in many cases, be challenged as such. Thus, in 
jurisdictions lacking explicit protections of social and economic rights, the right to equality can serve as a critical vehicle 
for disadvantaged groups seeking to enforce their social and economic rights.’
2 Domestic examples: Harjula v London Borough Council supra Harjula v London Borough Council [2011] EWHC 151 
(QB); R (W) v Birmingham City Council, [2011] EWHC 1147 Admin. International examples: Eldridge v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General) [1997] 3 S.C.R.; Awas Tingi v Nicaragua Inter-Am Ct HR, August 31 2001; Shelter Corporation v. Ontario 
Human Rights Commission (2001) 143 OAC 54; also Klickovic Pasalic and Karanovic v Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Sprska, CH/02/8923, CH/02/8924, CH/02/9364, 10 January 
2003; Khosa v Minister of Social Development, 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC)
3 Section 75 and Schedule 9 of the Northern Ireland Act provides for the statutory equality framework in Northern 
Ireland. See also - the Equality Pay Act (NI) (as amended) 1970, which provided equality in employment between men 
and women; Sex Discrimination (NI) Order (as amended) 1976; Fair Employment Act 1976, which provided equality in 
employment between those of different religious beliefs; Fair Employment (NI) Act 1989; Disability Act (UK wide) 1995; 
Race Relations (NI) Order 1997; Fair Employment and Treatment (NI) Order 1998; Police (NI) Act 2000; Equality (Disability 
etc) (NI) Order 2000; Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) (NI) Regulations 2003; Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006; Sex Discrimination (amendment of legislation) Regulations 2008
4 The subject matter of section 75 is reserved under para.42(b) of Schedule 3 NIA 1998.
5 See section 75 and Schedule 9 NIA
6 See the discussion paper on Gaps in equality law between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Equality Commission 
for Northern Ireland, March 2014, available at
http://www.equalityni.org/ECNI/media/ECNI/Consultation%20Responses/2014/Gaps-in-Equality-Law-in-GB-and-NI-
March-2014.pdf
7 Gaps in equality law between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, March 
2014, available at http://www.equalityni.org/ECNI/media/ECNI/Consultation%20Responses/2014/Gaps-in-Equality-
Law-in-GB-and-NI-March-2014.pdf, p.5
8 ibid
9 Gaps in equality law between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, March 
2014, available at http://www.equalityni.org/ECNI/media/ECNI/Consultation%20Responses/2014/Gaps-in-Equality-
Law-in-GB-and-NI-March-2014.pdf, p.7
10 Disability rights in Northern Ireland, Supplementary submission to inform the CRPD List of Issues on the UK, 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, February 2017, available 
at http://www.equalityni.org/ECNI/media/ECNI/Publications/Delivering%20Equality/CRPD-NI-supplementary-
submissionLOI.pdf
11 Council of Europe: Secretariat of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Fourth Opinion 
on the United Kingdom adopted on 25 May 2016 , 27 February 2017, ACFC/OP/IV(2016)005 para.27
12 Gaps p.1
13 The 2012 Annual statement, Human Rights in Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, http://
www.nihrc.org/documents/advice-to-government/2012/HRC_Annual_statement%202012.pdf 11; the 2016 Annual 
statement, Human Rights in Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, http://www.nihrc.org/
uploads/publications/StrictlyEmbargoeduntil00.01hrs8December2016.NIHRCAnnualStatement2016.pdf, 8 December 
2016, 17. See also the Advisory Committee to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
concluded: ‘Existing legislation in NI remains complex and piecemeal. Consolidated legislation, such as that adopted 
in Great-Britain, is needed to put an end to the significant discrepancies and inconsistencies that exist between the 
different jurisdictions.’ para.66, and ‘Additional steps should be taken to develop a comprehensive and human rights-
based antidiscrimination and equality legislation for Northern Ireland’, p.2, FCNM, Third Opinion on the UK, adopted on 
30 June 2011, ACFC/OP/III (2011) 006 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_3rd_OP_UK_
en.pdf
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circumstances, the domestic equality framework has actually 
gone beyond the EU framework meaning that domestic 
protection mechanisms are already more advanced than EU 
law provides. For example, in the Northern Ireland Ashers 
case,14 concerning the refusal of a bakery to make a cake 
with a message supporting gay marriage iced on it, the court 
relied on the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 
(Northern Ireland) 2006 which protect against discrimination 
based on sexual orientation in the provision of services – a 
protection not yet secured in EU law.15 However, much of the 
equality framework in both Northern Ireland and GB has been 
shaped by EU law or has come to fruition as a direct result of 
EU law. O’Cinneide has described EU law as ‘the engine that 
has hauled the development of UK anti-discrimination law 
along in its wake’. He has argued that, without its influence, 
‘British legal standards would be much weaker than they 
currently are.’16 This is most evident in the case law concerning 
non-discrimination on the grounds of age in the work place17, 
and in particular the use of Article 21 (equality and non-
discrimination) and Article 47 (the right to an effective remedy) 
of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights.18 Even 
in the Ashers case, jurisprudence from the CJEU was used to 
interpret equality provisions that did not originate in domestic 
law.
As we noted above, there is an added layer of complexity, 
because of Brexit. We saw above that those parts of existing 
Northern Ireland equality law that derive from EU law will 
be protected under Article 2 of the Ireland-Northern Ireland 
Protocol. That aside, however, the issue of whether previous 
EU competences should be retained at Westminster or 
devolved to the regions poses a potential difficulty for the 
non-EU-derived equality law. It is unclear whether former 
EU competences regarding equality will be devolved or not. 
On the one hand, not to devolve such competences would 
significantly weaken the ability of the NI Assembly to legislate 
within the generally devolved area of equality. On the other 
hand, stalemate has sometimes resulted in the past when 
attempts have been made to introduce increased protection 
for equality derived from EU law.19 For example, as the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Consortium has previously 
highlighted, the Northern Ireland Assembly was competent to 
legislate to give effect to the EU Council Directive 2004/113/
EC (prohibiting gender discrimination in the provision of 
services), as it fell within its devolved powers, but it failed 
to do so.20 The Explanatory Notes for the Regulations which 
were eventually issued state that ‘because the First Minister 
did not agree to the inclusion of references to transgender or 
gender reassignment in the Northern Ireland Regulations … 
the decision was taken to take forward UK-wide regulations 
at Westminster. It was considered … the most effective way of 
securing UK-wide compliance with our European Community 
obligations.’21 Brexit has significant implications for the future 
shape of equality law in both Northern Ireland and the rest of 
the UK.
Access to judicial review
The type of remedies available to individuals in NI and GB also 
differ. For example, in GB, an individual may seek judicial review 
of a decision by a public authority if the public sector equality 
duty under the Equality Act 2010 has not been met.22 During 
periods of austerity, this has resulted in courts overturning 
budgetary decisions which did not give due regard to promotion 
of equality.23 By way of example, in 2011 Birmingham City 
Council was forced to revisit a budgetary decision which cut 
services to vulnerable disabled clients within the local authority’s 
jurisdiction.24 The City Council had reduced vital services without 
properly considering the impact that this would have on disabled 
persons – a protected group under the Equality Act 2010. This 
amounted to a failure to comply with the duty to have due regard 
to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination and advance 
equality of opportunity under the public sector equality duty.25 As 
a result, the court quashed the decision.26 This is an example of 
ESR enforcement through a judicial remedy under the rubric of 
equality legislation.27
In Northern Ireland, disputes around compliance with equivalent 
equality provisions are adjudicated upon by the Equality 
Commission and judicial review of budgetary decisions by 
public bodies is restricted.28 This limits individual access to a 
judicial remedy for a breach of the public sector equality duty. 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
welcomed the development of administrative remedies such as 
that offered by the Equality Commission to deal with potential 
violations of ESC rights. The Committee has also recognised, 
however, that, whilst administrative measures may suffice as an 
effective remedy (without the need to resort to a judicial remedy), 
this is not always the case -- particularly with reference to 
obligations concerning non-discrimination.29
The distinct equality framework in Northern Ireland does not 
always reflect, therefore, the same level of judicial protection 
available to individuals in the rest of the UK. Learning from 
the broader GB experience and facilitating judicial review of 
compliance with the public sector equality duty in Northern 
Ireland could be achieved through an amendment to the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998, which would require Westminster 
legislation, to clarify that compliance with section 75 is subject 
to judicial review (after other remedies have been exhausted), or 
the courts could decide to depart from the Neill decision.
Extending section 75 to include socio-economic status among 
the protected grounds
Another way of extending equality law in Northern Ireland to 
enhance the protection of socio-economic rights would be 
for Westminster legislation to amend section 75 to include 
‘socio-economic disadvantage’ as a legally protected ground 
in that section. Currently, section 75 imposes a duty on public 
authorities to promote equality of opportunity between persons 
of different religious belief, political opinion, racial group, age, 
marital status or sexual orientation; between men and women 
generally; between persons with a disability and persons 
without; and between persons with dependants and persons 
without.30 The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland 
has noted that ‘whilst socio-economic disadvantage is not a 
specified ground under the equality legislation, the barriers and 
inequalities experienced by equality groups can be exacerbated 
by poverty and social exclusion.’31
A comparative analysis of socio-economic status as a 
grounds of discrimination in the employment context has 
argued that including socio-economic status as a ground of 
discrimination can help address ESR violations that occur 
as a result of social origin/socio-economic disadvantage, 
where poverty, social exclusion and social deprivation 
operate as constraints on an individual’s social mobility 
(sometimes across generations).32 For example, in the 
Canadian Northwest Territories, the Human Rights Act 2002 
defines socio-economic status as a ‘social condition’ with 
regard to ‘the condition of inclusion of the individual, other 
than on a temporary basis, in a socially identifiable group 
that suffers from social or economic disadvantage resulting 
from poverty, source of income, illiteracy, level of education 
or any other similar circumstance.’33 Other examples of 
legislative provisions in Canada include related grounds of 
discrimination such as ‘being in receipt of public assistance’, 
or ‘social income’ in order to combat socio-economic 
disadvantage (Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario). In 
addition, case law in New Zealand has developed so as to 
include discrimination on the grounds of employment status 
(albeit in a more restrictive approach than socio-economic 
status per se).34
14 Lee v Ashers Baking Co Ltd [2018] UKSC 49 (Supreme Court).
15 The EU Directive 2004/113/EC goes as far as protecting against discrimination between sexes in the provision of 
goods and services but not on the basis of sexual orientation (or other characteristics). In the Ashers case the claim 
based on sexual orientation discrimination failed. Another example is that Northern Ireland’s law protects people 
against discrimination on the grounds of political opinion in a way that does not exist in other parts of the UK or under 
EU law.
16 Colm O’Cinneide, Equality rights in a post-Brexit United Kingdom, 29 July 2016, JCHR Report Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, The human rights implications of Brexit, https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/
jtrights/695/695.pdf
17 For example the recognition of horizontal rights by the CJEU in C-144/04 Mangold (22 November 2005) and applied 
in Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci (19 January 2010) imposing the requirement for national courts to suspend national 
law which breaches the principle of age discrimination (noting the subsequent reluctance to extend in C-282/10 
Dominguez (24 January 2012).
18 Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of 
a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. The EU Charter is enforceable 
when engaging with EU law the scope of which covers employment law.
19 The Sexual Orientation Regulations were indeed passed in Westminster during a period of dissolution of the NI 
Assembly.
20 Northern Ireland Human Rights Consortium, Evidence of the Human Rights Consortium to the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights Inquiry: What are the human rights implications of Brexit? October 2016, available at http://www.
humanrightsconsortium.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/HRC-Submission-to-JCHR-Inquiry-HR-Implications-of-
Brexit-10.10.16.pdf
21 Explanatory Memorandum to the Sex Discrimination (Amendment of Legislation) Regulations SI 2008/963:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/963/pdfs/uksiem_20080963_en.pdf
22 Prior to 6 April 2011 the relevant equality duties were contained in the Race Relations Act 1976 s.71; Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975 s.76A(1); and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 s.49A(1). Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 is now in force. 
The public sector equality duty extends to all the protected characteristics namely age, disability, gender reassignment, 
marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. For a 
fuller discussion on the impact of the Equality Act 2010 see Sandra Fredman, ‘Positive duties and socio-economic 
disadvantage: bringing disadvantage onto the equality agenda’ [2010] European Human Rights Law Review 290
23 See the domestic case examples mentioned above: Harjula v London Borough Council supra Harjula v London 
Borough Council [2011] EWHC 151 (QB); R(W) v Birmingham City Council, [2011] EWHC 1147 Admin
24 BBC, ‘Birmingham City Council care funding cuts unlawful’, 20 April 2011, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-england-birmingham-13147675; Helen Carter, ‘Birmingham council’s plan to cut care for disabled ruled unlawful’ 
The Guardian, 19 May 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2011/may/19/birmingham-council-cut-
disabled-care-unlawful Tim Ross, ‘High Court: Council must not axe care for elderly’ The Telegraph, 19 May 2011, http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/8524591/High-Court-Council-must-not-axe-care-for-elderly.html; Nicholas 
Timmins, ‘Curb on disabled care ruled unlawful’ The Financial Times, 19 May 2011 available at http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/704f5a6a-8249-11e0-961e-00144feabdc0
25 Section 149 Equality Act 2010.
26 R(W) v Birmingham City Council, [2011] EWHC 1147 Admin
27 R(W) v Birmingham City Council, [2011] EWHC 1147 Admin
28 See Neill’s Application [2006] NICA 5 on the court’s reluctance to make the s75 statutory equality duty amenable to 
judicial review. However, note at para.30 “We incline to the opinion, however, that there may well be occasions where a 
judicial review challenge to a public authority’s failure to observe section 75 would lie.”
29 Paragraph 9 of General Comment 9 of the Committee provides that ‘an ultimate right of judicial appeal from 
administrative procedures of this type would also often be appropriate.’ UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 9: The domestic application of the Covenant, 3 December 1998, 
E/C.12/1998/24
30 Section 75 (a)-(d) of the Northern Ireland Act
31 Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, Recommendations: Programme for Government (PfG) and Budget (May 
2016)
32 Shane Kilcommins, Siobhán Mullally, Emma McClean, Maeve McDonagh, Darius Whelan, ‘Extending the Scope 
of Employment Legislation: Comparative Perspectives on the Prohibited Grounds of Discrimination’, Report 
Commissioned by the Department of Justice, Equality and Reform (Government of Ireland, 2004)
33 Section 1 Human Rights Act 2002 Northwest Territories, Canada
34 Shane Kilcommins, Siobhán Mullally, Emma McClean, Maeve McDonagh, Darius Whelan, ‘Extending the Scope 
of Employment Legislation: Comparative Perspectives on the Prohibited Grounds of Discrimination’, Report 
Commissioned by the Department of Justice, Equality and Reform (Government of Ireland, 2004)
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McKeever and Ní Aoláin have documented the development 
of equality legislation within Northern Ireland and have 
encouraged a move beyond a programmatic protection of 
socio-economic rights to a more inclusive and substantive 
enforcement model coupled with judicial remedies.35 They 
argue that ESR protection would be better facilitated in 
Northern Ireland by amending section 75 to include ‘socio-
economic status’ as part of the procedural duty to have due 
regard to encouraging equality of opportunity.36 As above, any 
change to section 75 is not within the devolved competence 
of the Northern Ireland Assembly: it requires legislation at 
Westminster.
The existing socio-economic duty in the Equality Act 2010 
(which does not extend to Northern Ireland and has not 
yet been brought into force in England) imposes a public 
sector duty on public authorities regarding socio-economic 
inequalities. Section 1 of the Act provides that a public 
authority must, when making decisions of a strategic nature 
about how to exercise its functions, have due regard to the 
desirability of exercising them in a way that is designed to 
reduce the inequalities of outcome that result from socio-
economic disadvantage. The purpose of the provision was 
to reduce inequalities in education, health, housing, crime 
rates or other matters associated with socio-economic 
disadvantage.37 Before the Act came into force there was a 
change in the UK Government. The Act had been developed 
by the Labour administration of Gordon Brown but when 
the Coalition Government came to power in 2010 the then 
Minister for Women and Equalities, Theresa May, refused to 
commence this particular provision.38 However, the provision 
is still on the statute book and could be brought fully into 
effect at a later stage.
In 2016 the Scottish Parliament was granted devolved 
competence to bring into force in Scotland the section 1 
public sector duty regarding socio-economic inequalities.39 
This power was exercised to introduce provisions targeted at 
reducing socio-economic inequalities, renamed the ‘Fairer 
Scotland’ duty, from April 2018.40 The same power has now 
been devolved to Wales under section 45 of the Wales Act 
2017. Although that power has not been exercised yet, Welsh 
ministers would have done so in 2020 had not Covid-19 
intervened to delay its introduction. A similar approach could 
be introduced in Northern Ireland if Westminster were to 
devolve competence to the Northern Ireland Assembly in the 
equivalent manner as has occurred in Scotland and Wales.
(2) A duty to have due regard to the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
The Northern Ireland Assembly41, the Scottish Parliament42 and 
the Welsh Assembly (as it then was)43 have each introduced 
statutory duties to have regard to particular international 
treaties in the devolved context. As alluded to in Chapter 2 (on 
model 1), it would be within the competence of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly to introduce legislation that requires 
Ministers and public bodies to have ‘due regard’ (echoing the 
language of section 75 NIA) to existing international ESR treaty 
obligations. This could provide a ‘self-regulatory’ mechanism 
for ESR in observance of international obligations.44 For 
example, the Assembly could introduce a duty to have 
due regard to the UK’s obligations under the ICESCR when 
legislating in devolved areas.
The duty to have due regard to international ESR obligations, 
does not in itself guarantee a justiciable right to the 
substantive realisation of any particular economic or social 
right. Rather, judicial review would be available to scrutinise 
whether the decision maker took the right into consideration 
during the decision-making process. It must also be noted 
that legislative protection of human rights in this form is not 
free from the threat of repeal or retrogressive measures. For 
example, the UK Parliament introduced the Child Poverty 
Act 2010, which promoted the progressive realisation of 
an adequate standard of living under Article 27 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, but Parliament later 
repealed the duty under the Welfare Reform and Work Act 
2016.45
In other words, the duty to have ‘due regard’ can be complied 
with without actually complying with the relevant norms, 
so long as due consideration has been given to the right in 
question. This type of duty is a procedural as opposed to a 
substantive duty. Nonetheless, it may be an attractive starting 
point from which to begin mainstreaming ESR into the 
decision-making process in Northern Ireland. Certainly, a 
duty to consider ICESCR when forming budgetary decisions, 
for example, would help to bring ESR to the forefront of the 
decision-making process without necessarily undermining 
the allocation of resources, given the procedural nature of the 
duty.46 Another example in this vein, where a ‘due regard’ duty 
might well be helpful is when the Programme for Government 
is being developed. While the duty to have due regard 
is, therefore, not as robust a mechanism as one that fully 
incorporated ESR as provided for in international law, and 
placed limits on future repeal,47 it is not without its attractions.
According to a recent OECD study, gender budgeting is 
increasingly prevalent in government budget processes. 
Almost half of OECD countries (15 out of 34 members) have 
introduced, plan to introduce, or are actively considering 
the introduction of gender budgeting.48 Among others, both 
Austria and Iceland have introduced legislation to support 
gender budgeting. Iceland’s Organic Budget Law (Public 
Finance Act 123/2015) has provided for gender budgeting since 
2016. The Finance Minister, in consultation with the Minister 
responsible for gender equality, heads a group responsible 
for the formulation of a gender budgeting programme, and 
this is taken into account in the drafting of the budget bill, 
which must outline its effects on gender equality targets.49 
Since 2009, Austria has been provided for gender budgeting 
in the Federal Constitution,50 and since 2013 gender budgeting 
must be implemented at the federal level.51 The Scottish 
Government has produced an Equality Statement as part of 
the Scottish Budget process since 2009. Although the impact 
of such initiatives is still being assessed, at its best, gender 
budgeting helps to mainstream gender within government 
policies, to hold government to account for gender policy 
promises in the allocation of financial resources, to increase 
the transparency of the budget process, to encourage civil 
society participation, and to contribute to better targeting of 
policy measures. Two mechanisms are, according to Quinn, 
most commonly associated with gender budgeting: ‘(i) the 
inclusion of instructions on gender budgeting in the regular 
budget circular issued by the Ministry of Finance, and (ii) an 
annual gender budget statement, outlining how the budget has 
contributed to the attainment of gender equality outcomes, 
presented to parliament.’52 Similar mechanisms could be 
introduced to ‘mainstream’ ICESCR obligations in the budget 
process in Northern Ireland.
(3) Incorporation of an international ESR treaty such as 
ICESCR
If the duty to have due regard is considered an insufficiently 
robust approach compared with one that fully incorporated 
ESR as provided for in international law, and placed limits 
on future repeal, then another legislative option would 
be to introduce a statutory regime which incorporates an 
international ESR treaty.53 There are already examples at the 
domestic level which demonstrate the viability of this model. 
The most obvious in the UK context relates to the virtual 
incorporation into domestic UK law via the Human Rights 
Act 1998 of the, mostly, civil and political rights found in the 
European Convention of Human Rights.
35 Grainne McKeever and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Enforcing Socio Economic 
Rights in Northern Ireland’ [2004] 2 European Human Rights Law Review 158, 166
36 McKeever and Ní Aoláin ibid 172
37 Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/
notes/division/3/1/1, accessed 10 September 2013, para.23. The explanatory notes also offer example 
scenarios in how the application of this provision was envisaged: ‘The Department of Health decides to 
improve the provision of primary care services. They find evidence that people suffering socio-economic 
disadvantage are less likely to access such services during working hours, due to their conditions of 
employment. The Department therefore advises that such services should be available at other times of the 
day.’
38 Amelia Gentleman, Theresa May scraps legal requirement to reduce inequality, The Guardian, 17 
November 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2010/nov/17/theresa-may-scraps-legal-
requirement-inequality
39 Section 38 of the Scotland Act 2016
40 The Equality Act 2010 (Commencement No 13) (Scotland) Order 2017, SSI 2017/403; see also The Equality 
Act 2010 (Authorities Subject to the Socio-economic Inequality Duty) (Scotland) Regulations 2018, SSI 
2018/101.
41 Section 2(3)(b) of the Commissioner for Older People Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 requires the 
Commissioner to have regard to the United Nations Principles for Older Persons when carry out his/her 
functions and section 6(3)(b) of the Commissioner for Children and Young People (Northern Ireland) Order 
2003 the Commissioner must have regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in exercising his/
her functions
42 Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 (2014 Act) requires specified public authorities, including 
all local authorities and health boards, to report every 3 years on the steps they have taken to secure better or 
further effect of the UNCRC
43 Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011 imposes a duty on Welsh Ministers to have 
due regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) in performance of their functions 44 
Schedule 2 paragraph 3(c) NIA 1998 exempts observing and implementing international obligations from the 
‘international relations’ exception.
45 Section 7.
46 See further, for example, the outputs of the QUB Budget Analysis Project, especially Rory O’Connell, Aoife 
Nolan, Colin Harvey, Mira Dutschke, Eoin Rooney, Applying an International Human Rights Framework 
to State Budget Allocations: Rights and Resources (Routledge, 2014). See also Deloitte and Social Change 
Initiative, Shifting Gear: Accelerating Public Service Transformation: Opportunities for Northern Ireland 
(2020). 47 S. Peterson, ‘Constitutional Entrenchment in England and the UK’ U.K. Const. L. Blog (25th March 
2014) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/). 48 Downes, R., L. von Trapp and S. Nicol (2017), “Gender 
budgeting in OECD countries”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, vol. 16/3, https://doi.org/10.1787/budget-16-
5jfq80dq1zbn.
49 OECD, Budgeting and Public Expenditures in OECD Countries 2019 (OECD, 2019).
50 Article 13.
51 https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/portfolio-items/austria-gender-budgeting/
52 Sheila Quinn, Gender Budgeting in Europe: What can we learn from best practice, Administration, 65(3) 
(2017), 101, Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319010112_Gender_budgeting_in_
Europe_What_can_we_learn_from_best_practice [accessed Aug 03 2019]
53 An example of a non-incorporated treaty dealing with ESC rights is the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, UN General Assembly, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, 
vol. 993, 3. Other treaties which provide for ESR include but are not limited to the European Social Charter 
(Revised) 1996, Council of Europe, ETS 163; the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, UN General 
Assembly, resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3; the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 1979, UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 
December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13; the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination 1965, United Nations General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965 United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195; and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006, 
United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/61/106 of 24 January 2007, 76th plenary meeting; issued 
in GAOR, 61st sess., Suppl. no. 49. “Annex: Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”: p. 2-29
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54 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 9: The domestic 
application of the Covenant, 3 December 1998, E/C.12/1998/24, para.7
55 General Comment No.9, para.1
56 General Comment No.9, para.6
57 Ibid
58 Ibid – see for example the constitutions of Argentina 1853 (reinst. 1983, rev. 1994), Angola (2010), Macedonia 
1991 (rev 2011), Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995 (rev. 2009), Cape Verde 1980 (rev. 1992), Croatia 1991 (rev.2001), Czech 
Republic 1993 (rev. 2002), Democratic Republic of the Congo 2005 (rev. 2011), East Timor 2002, Eritrea 1997, 
Ethiopia 1994, Iran 1979 (rev. 1989), Macedonia 1991 (rev. 2011), Montenegro 2007; Mozambique 2004 (rev. 
2007); Nepal 2006 (rev. 2010); Nicaragua 1987 (rev. 2005); Portugal 1976 (rev. 2005); Rwanda 2003 (rev. 2010); 
Sao Tome and Principe 1975 (rev. 1990);
Slovakia 1992 (rev. 2001); Surinam 1987 (rev. 1992). Each of these constitutions seek to explicitly protect 
‘economic, social and cultural rights’.
59 We are grateful to Bruce Porter for his contribution to this part of the chapter.
60 National Housing Strategy Act, SC 2019, c 29, s 313 (NHSA) (emphasis added).
61 Section 87, Northern Ireland Act 1998.
62 Section 2(3).
63 See generally Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1999) and his ‘The Core 
of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346. See also Conor Gearty, who discusses 
the danger of relying on courts for quick fixes in relation to ESR: Conor Gearty and Virginia Mantouvalou, 
Debating Social Rights (Hart 2011).
As noted above, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has advised on the domestic implementation 
of ICESCR, and recommends that ESR ought to be protected 
by states in the same way that civil and political rights are 
protected domestically.54 Based on an analysis of state 
practice, the Committee identified a variety of approaches 
that are legitimately used given the broad flexible approach 
required by the Covenant.55 Some states have transformed 
the Covenant into domestic law by supplementing or 
amending existing legislation, without invoking the specific 
terms of ICESCR.56 Others have adopted or incorporated the 
Convention into domestic law, so that its terms are retained 
intact and given formal validity in the national legal order,57 
often by means of constitutional provisions.58
Without a written constitution, incorporation into domestic 
law in any part of the UK would require the introduction of an 
Act in the Westminster Parliament or in a devolved legislature.
It will be useful at this point to consider a recent Canadian 
variation.59 The recently adopted National Housing Strategy Act 
in Canada provides a useful example of legislative recognition 
of an ESC right that provides for a different type of access 
to justice so as to engage with the obligation of progressive 
realization without relying on courts. The Act declares that 
it is the housing policy of the Government of Canada to 
‘recognize that the right to adequate housing is a fundamental 
human right affirmed in international law’ and commits the 
government to ‘further the progressive realization of the 
right to adequate housing as recognized in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.’ 60
Affected communities are able to make submissions 
on systemic issues to an independent Federal Housing 
Advocate supported by the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission. Submissions are to be investigated, including 
through consultation with affected communities, with 
recommendations submitted to the Government. 
Alternatively, a ‘Housing Advocate’ may refer critical systemic 
issues to a Review Panel to hold hearings ‘in a manner that 
offers the public, particularly members of communities that 
are affected by the issue and groups that have expertise in 
human rights and housing, an opportunity to participate’. 
The Review Panel may then deliver its opinion on the issue 
and recommend any necessary remedial measures. The 
Government is required to respond in a timely manner to 
findings and recommendations from the Housing Advocate or 
the Review Panel and must develop and maintain a National 
Housing Strategy to ‘further’ the housing policy based on the 
realization of the right to housing, ‘taking into account key 
principles of a human rights-based approach to housing.’
(4) Enacting specific legislation on ESR in Northern Ireland
It might be thought that an obvious way in which to protect 
socio-economic rights in Northern Ireland would be through 
piecemeal legislation enacted by the Northern Ireland 
Assembly aimed at protecting specific economic or social 
rights. Indeed, the Assembly has already enacted such 
legislation, albeit in an uncoordinated manner. It has been 
able to do so because responsibility for a significant range of 
socio-economic issues has already been devolved to Northern 
Ireland institutions. These issues include health, education, 
housing and (uniquely in the United Kingdom devolution 
arrangements) employment.
By way of example:
• the Mesothelioma etc (NI) Act 2008 provides for 
compensation to be paid to people suffering from diffuse 
mesothelioma in Northern Ireland (or their dependent if the 
sufferer is deceased) regardless of their employment status;
• the Children’s Services Co-operation Act (NI) 2015 – which 
started life as a Private Members’ Bill – requires certain public 
authorities and other persons to co-operate in order to 
contribute to the well-being of children and young people;
• the Shared Education Act (NI) 2016 imposes a duty on 
the Department of Education ‘to encourage, facilitate and 
promote shared education’ for children from Protestant and 
Catholic backgrounds;
• the Addressing Bullying in Schools Act (NI) 2016 places a duty 
on boards of governors of schools to put in place measures 
against bullying;
• the Rural Needs Act (NI) 2016 requires public authorities 
 such as the Northern Ireland Housing Executive to have 
due regard to rural needs when developing and delivering 
policies and services;
• under Northern Ireland’s employment law employees who 
lose their job have a possible claim for unfair dismissal after 
just one year of employment; this qualifying period was not 
increased to two years when that step was taken for England, 
Scotland and Wales in 2012.
Even in areas in which there are restrictions on devolved 
competence, opportunities have arisen for particular socio-
economic rights to be protected by the NI Assembly. As 
regards the welfare benefits system, for example, the relevant 
Minister in Northern Ireland must consult with the Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland to ensure that there are ‘single 
systems’ of social security, child support and pensions in 
both Northern Ireland and Great Britain.61 But in 2015 this 
requirement did not prevent the Northern Ireland Assembly 
from being able to agree special ‘mitigation’ measures to 
lessen the effects of social security reform in Northern Ireland 
compared with the rest of the United Kingdom. Due to time 
constraints those measures were then legislated for by the UK 
Parliament through the Northern Ireland (Welfare Reform) 
Act 2015, the Welfare Reform (NI) Order 2015 and various sets 
of Regulations. The net effect is that, during the 4-year period 
2016-2020, recipients of welfare benefits in Northern Ireland 
received an additional several million over and above the 
amount they would have received had the welfare reforms in 
Great Britain been adopted in Northern Ireland without any 
locally negotiated mitigation measures.
One option for the future, therefore, would be for Members 
of the Northern Ireland Assembly to agree further pieces of 
legislation which would enhance the protection of specific 
ESR in Northern Ireland, in ways that would ensure fuller 
compliance with international human rights law. The 
standards set out in relevant international instruments – 
whether ‘hard law’ or ‘soft law’ documents – could be reflected 
in such legislation. As noted earlier, the Assembly adopted 
this approach (to some extent at least) in the Commissioner 
for Older People Act (NI) 2011, where it required the 
Commissioner for Older People, when considering the 
interests of older persons and deciding how to exercise the 
Commissioner’s
functions, to ‘have regard to the United Nations Principles for 
Older Persons adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 16 December 1991’.62
A self-evident advantage of this option, besides the fact that 
it has already been used by the Assembly, is that it allows 
progress to be made on ESR on an issue-by-issue basis rather 
than waiting for a ‘big bang’ solution. In addition, it achieves 
protection for ESR through the votes of democratically elected 
politicians rather than, as some would see it, the adventitious 
decisions of unelected and unrepresentative judges. Realising 
rights through agreed political action rather than through the 
courts might be thought to bestow greater legitimacy on those 
rights,63 and they may establish a mechanism that avoids some 
of the disadvantages associated with judicial enforcement. In 
the Canadian housing context, rights holders have, in a sense, 
traded off the advantages of judicial enforcement for the 
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advantages of enhanced participation, a commitment to
structural transformation, and an ability to address systemic 
issues that Canadian courts have proven themselves resistant 
to engaging with. The legislation is a foray into what has been 
labelled ‘democratic experimentalism’ in the field of human 
rights, in which the traditional approach to adjudicative 
finality and enforceable rights is replaced by participatory 
processes for the interpretation and implementation of legal 
rights.64 Rights-based participatory processes may be an 
important component, and potential benefit, of models that 
do not rely exclusively or primarily on courts. Furthermore, a 
piecemeal approach allows for a highly flexible approach to 
the protection of ESR, taking into account the prevailing social 
and economic circumstances and the resources available, an 
approach encouraged by the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.65
This piecemeal approach has several weaknesses, however. 
The Assembly might overlook particular rights, or not go far 
enough in reflecting international standards when trying to 
protect the rights that it does address.66 The approach taken 
may be seen to be in tension with the important human rights 
principle of the universality of rights. Further, it is often the 
most marginalised groups who need the most protection 
but may be left behind by political systems. Progress on 
enhancing the protection of ESR would continue to be partial 
and relatively unsystematised, and such specific legislation 
would be easily amended or repealed. The protection afforded 
to the rights in question might not be as ‘entrenched’ as the 
Convention rights protected by the Human Rights Act 1998. 
It is also relevant to add that, as this option already exists, 
elected representatives could have used it to protect ESR 
and done so only marginally. Therefore, this option is highly 
dependent on continuing political agreement in the Assembly 
on rights – something that we have suggested above is in very 
short supply in Northern Ireland.
These defects could be addressed, in part at least, if some of 
the measures suggested within other models set out in this 
report were to be adopted; the models, we repeat, are not 
mutually exclusive. For example, reliance on pre-legislative 
scrutiny and codes of practice, as proposed in model 1 (see 
Chapter 2), could help to guide Members of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly in the ‘rights’ direction. Similarly, the 
adoption of ‘Directive Principles’, as proposed in model 3 (see 
Chapter 4), could provide a suitable prompt and a justification 
for the tabling of legislation on specific ESR.
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CHAPTER 4:
CONSTITUTIONALISING 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS PRINCIPLES, 




In this chapter, we consider a model in 
which a constitutional document provides 
for non-directly justiciable economic 
and social rights principles which are 
addressed to the State in its policy and law-
making. These are referred to as ‘directive 
principles’ and have been adopted in several 
jurisdictions internationally.1 There are 
various degrees of economic and social 
rights enforceability that can accompany a 
directive principles approach; sometimes 
the judiciary can play a role in enforcement, 
short of making economic and social rights 
justiciable in the same way as civil and 
political rights. In what follows, this model 
and how it could potentially apply in the 
Northern Ireland context is outlined, before 
turning to consider comparative experience 
via case studies of Ireland, India and 
Finland. We consider the model’s strengths 
and weaknesses, including the extent to 
which the contextual factors considered 
above affect an assessment as to whether this 
is a viable model for ESR protection.
(1) What are directive principles?
Directive principles can be described as provisions in a 
constitutional document that are not directly binding or 
enforceable but that reflect important social norms and 
generate expectations to hold politicians and policymakers 
accountable for the positive obligations they contain.2 
Directive principles are designed to guide the legislature 
and executive in their exercise of power, who are expected 
to take steps to realise the directive principles. Due to their 
constitutional nature, directive principles can be taken into 
consideration by the judiciary in the course of their work, but 
they cannot be directly adjudicated on. On the latter aspect, 
Alan Gledhill elaborates that, ‘even though these principles 
are not directly enforceable in court, they are bound to affect 
the decisions of courts on constitutional questions, just as the 
provisions of the Magna Carta have affected the decisions of 
the English judges’.3 Bertus de Villiers elaborates further that 
‘these directive principles are the embodiment of a national 
spirit and consensus on social, economic and cultural issues 
which have to be addressed by the state. Although they do 
not provide a basis of legal action if programmes are not 
undertaken, various governments have used the directive 
principles to bring about far-reaching socio-economic 
reform’.4
It is very important to distinguish between enforceable legal 
provisions in constitutional documents, which are justiciable, 
and directive principles, which are not.
Constitutions can include both. Generally enforceable 
constitutional provisions will make explicitly clear that the 
provision or right in question is legally binding on the state 
or that citizens may avail of legal action if the provision is 
unfulfilled. In contrast, directive principles in constitutional 
provisions acknowledge a right but either explicitly exclude 
citizens legal recourse to enforce it or present the right as a 
desirable goal generally.5 For example, Article 45 of the Irish 
Constitution states that ‘The principles of social policy set 
forth in this Article are intended for the general guidance 
of the Oireachtas. The application of those principles in the 
making of laws shall be the care of the Oireachtas exclusively, 
and shall not be cognisable by any Court under any of the 
provisions of this Constitution’.
(2) What would protection of economic and social rights via 
this model involve?
In order to protect economic and social rights via this model 
in Northern Ireland a constitutional document, such as a 
Bill of Rights, would need to be enacted which laid down 
economic and social rights as directive principles. The 
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive would then hold 
principal responsibility to act in a way that promotes and 
realises the rights outlined as directive principles, and could 
be held to political, although not legal, account if they did not. 
The extent to which the judiciary could engage in enforcement 
of these directive principles would depend on the particular 
model that is adopted and the willingness of the judiciary 
to engage such principles in interpreting enforceable Bill of 
Rights provisions and other legislative enactments. Varying 
approaches that have been taken by the judiciary in directive 
principles provisions are outlined below in the comparative 
experiences section. There are a number of strengths and 
drawbacks involved in the protection of economic and 
social rights via directive principles in Northern Ireland. 
Before considering these, however, we review the available 
comparative experience of the operation of such a model.
(3) The experience of directive principles: comparative case 
studies
Republic of Ireland
The Irish Constitution is regarded as one of the first to 
contain directive principles, and has been used as a model 
for constitutional design in this area.6 Articles 40 to 44 of the 
Irish Constitution outline a number of fundamental rights 
which are followed in Article 45 by directive principles 
relating to social welfare. As outlined above, Article 45 
explicitly characterises these principles as non-justiciable. 
Interestingly, the right to education is part of the fundamental 
rights protected in Article 42, meaning that education rights 
are not part of the non-justiciable principles outlined 
in Article 45. Thus, it is not entirely accurate to say that 
fundamental rights pertain to civil and political rights in the 
Irish Constitution and directive principles to economic and 
social rights, but a distinction along these lines is generally 
apparent from the Constitution’s preparatory notes.7 In 
addition, Gerard Hogan notes that ‘this distinction has not 
worked quite as straightforwardly in practice as the drafters 
might have intended’.8 This in part is due to the approach 
taken by the Irish courts to directive principles. The Irish 
courts have generally taken a strict approach to Article 45 
and have accordingly been conservative in their engagement 
with directive principles. In doing so the Irish judiciary 
have demonstrated a marked deference to the separation of 
powers.
The use to which Article 45 is put is also influenced by the 
Irish courts approach to the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights in general. Although Hogan noted in 2001 that the 
Irish courts have ‘refused to treat socio-economic rights as 
being entirely non-justiciable in nature’,9 the courts have 
nevertheless been cautious in enforcing them. The Irish courts 
did make it clear in the seminal case of O’Reilly v. Limerick 
Corporation,10 a case involving Travellers asserting their living 
conditions breached constitutional rights, that fundamental 
socio-economic issues surrounding how the national wealth 
was distributed were a matter for the state. Some consider, 
however, that the Irish Supreme Court may be softening its 
approach to ESR. In NHV v Minister for Justice and Equality 
[2017] IESC 35, the Court ruled that indefinitely banning all 
1 These include India, Ireland, Spain, Finland and Malta.
2 Elizabeth Kaletski, Lanse Minkler, Nishith Prakash and Susan Randolph, ‘Does Constitutionalising Economic 
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3 Alan Gledhill, The Republic of India: The Development of Its Laws and Constitution (London: Stevens & 
Sons, 1964) 161-162.
4 Bertus de Villiers, ‘Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights: The Indian Experience’ South 
African Journal on Human Rights (1992) 2: 29. For a more recent assessment of the efficacy of the directive 
principles see A. Pillay, ‘Revisiting the Indian Experience of Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: the 
Need for a Principled Approach to Judicial Activism and Restraint, (2014)The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 63(2), 385-408.
5 See further Kaletski et al above n 2 at 440.
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See Gerard Hogan, ‘Directive Principles, Social and Economic Rights and the Constitution’ Irish Jurist (2001) 
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asylum seekers from looking for work was a violation of the 
unenumerated constitutional right to seek employment. The 
Court continued to cast doubt on the justiciability of socio-
economic rights but nevertheless ruled that section 9(4) of the 
Refugee Act 1966 went too far in prohibiting access to work.
In this context, it might be concluded that directive principles 
have had a minimal impact in the Irish jurisdiction.11 
Nevertheless, in a number of cases Irish courts have viewed 
directive principles as of supplementary assistance in 
interpreting other constitutional provisions. For example, 
the case of Murtagh Properties Ltd. v. Cleary utilised Article 
45 as a guide to rights protected under Art 40 in relation to 
the right to earn a livelihood without discrimination on the 
basis of sex.12 In 2008, Charleton J in the High Court said that 
Article 45 could be used by the State to defend itself against 
a challenge that a legislative provision was unconstitutional 
(so, it’s a shield but not a sword).13 In another High Court case 
in 2017, Humphreys J referred to Article 45 when making an 
order requiring a local authority to carry out remedial work 
regarding an illegal landfill operation. He suggested Article 
45 could influence the courts in their choice of appropriate 
remedies and he said that ‘[v]igilant and effective protection of 
the environment is an implied constitutional obligation’.14 But 
in the NHV case, the Court seemed to imply that the principles 
in Article 45 should not be used to help determine the 
unenumerated constitutional rights in Ireland. That was also 
Hogan J’s view when the case was before the Court of Appeal.
Outside the courts, there is ongoing political and legal debate 
surrounding a better way to protect economic and social 
rights in the Irish context. While in 1996 the Irish Constitution 
Review Group recommended against stronger ESR protection 
in the Constitution, citing traditional reasons relating to 
the separation of powers, in 2014 an Irish Constitutional 
Convention voted in favour of adding justiciable economic 
and social rights to the Constitution. The Irish Human Rights 
and Equality Commission has indicated that it wants ‘the 
totality of…human rights guaranteed in the Constitution’.15
India
Following the outline of a list of fundamental rights in Part 
III, Part IV of the Indian Constitution lays down a number of 
directive principles of state policy pertaining to economic 
and social rights. In a similar manner to the Irish Constitution, 
Article 37 of the Indian Constitution states that ‘the provisions 
contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, 
but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless 
fundamental in the governance of the county and it shall be 
the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws’.
What makes the Indian experience of directive principles 
unique, and indeed marks a notable contrast from the Irish 
context, is not so much any innovative approach to the 
outline of the directive principles themselves, but the way 
in which the Indian courts have interpreted and used them. 
This experience draws particular attention to the relationship 
between fundamental rights and directive principles. While 
the Constitution explicitly characterises fundamental rights 
as enforceable and directive principles as not, a question has 
arisen over the nature of the relationship between the two 
and various approaches have been taken by Indian courts 
over the years.
In the early years fundamental rights were perceived as 
sacrosanct, the Indian courts taking this approach in the cases 
of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan,16 M H Quareshi v State of 
Bihar17 and Re Kerala Education Bill, 1957.18 In this line of case 
law the judiciary approached fundamental rights as primary, 
directive principles not holding the same constitutional 
standing, and it was not possible to consider a law or executive 
action as void for non-adherence to directive principles. 
While fundamental rights and directive principles were to be 
interpreted harmoniously where they conflict fundamental 
rights carry more weight.19
Following criticism of this early approach indicating that 
the judiciary failed to appreciate the Constitution and the 
needs of society, courts subsequently moved to attempt to 
interpret fundamental rights and directive principles in a 
complementary and supplementary manner.20 The first key 
case in this approach was Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan21 
where the courts initiated the new approach that fundamental 
rights should be interpreted in light of directive principles. 
This moved away from a hierarchical relationship between 
fundamental rights and directive principles and utilised the 
latter as to interpret the former.
The Indian courts can be perceived to have adopted a third 
approach to directive principles which followed the case 
of Maneka Gandhi v Union of India22 and characterises the 
current period. This approach sees the courts taking a more 
direct role in addressing socio-economic problems. De Villiers 
comments that this is based on two arguments, ‘the first is 
that it was the intention of the framers of the constitution that 
the state should not only be aware of what was expected of it, 
but that it should have constitutional support for undertaking 
socio-economic projects. The second is that, due to the 
conservative approach of the courts through the years, the 
state has not succeeded in effectively fulfilling its obligations 
as formulated in the directive principles’.23 In this approach the 
court does not only interpret law but utilises the Constitution 
in order to achieve social justice, being more attentive to 
the obligations on state which are contained in the directive 
principles.24 In this view the court ‘no longer considers the 
principles as less important than fundamental rights in order 
to accommodate the directive principles’.25
Thus, in the Indian experience directive principles have 
been approached in the Indian context as the constitutional 
framework within which fundamental rights should be 
understood.26 While distinct from one another, there is 
considerable overlap between fundamental rights, and that 
which they seek to uphold, and directive principles.27 The 
Indian courts have taken an increasingly activist approach 
to directive principles. This has involved interpreting the 
reference to ‘making of laws’ in Article 37 as providing 
enough scope to allow them to interpret laws in light of the 
directive principles.28 While it is not possible for Indian courts 
to strike down legislation due to incompatibility with the 
directive principles, the principles can and have been used 
to uphold legislation where it otherwise would have been 
nullified, and the courts have permitted legislative restrictions 
on fundamental rights in order to uphold the aims of the 
directive principles.29 The existence of directive principles 
in the Constitution has also allowed the courts to interpret 
fundamental rights in a more creative way than might 
otherwise have been adopted.30
However, it is also important to note the limitation of directive 
principles in this context. While the Indian judiciary have 
taken a much more active and creative role in engagement 
and use of directive principles than the Irish judiciary, 
Bertus de Villiers notes that the directive principles have not 
been ‘a panacea for the intense socio-economic problems 
experienced by India’.31 Financial constraints of government, 
a lack of political will and structural conditions within Indian 
society have limited the impact of the directive principles 
and realisation of economic and social rights. Therefore, the 
success of directive principles in the Indian experience in 
terms of achieving protection and realisation of economic and 
social rights still remains limited.
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Finland
A third comparative experience that can be taken into 
account is that of Finland which has adopted a variation of the 
approaches taken in Ireland and India. Several economic and 
social rights are mentioned in the Constitution of Finland but 
the responsibility is placed on the legislature to implement 
these rights, and litigation is based largely on the specific 
legislation enacted to implement the right, rather than the 
Constitution itself. For example, section 16 on educational 
rights provides in part: ‘The public authorities shall, as 
provides in more detail by an Act, guarantee …’. Section 17, 
on the right to one’s language and culture, provides in part: 
‘The right of everyone to use his or her own language … shall 
be guaranteed by an Act.’ Section 18, on the right to work, 
provides in part: ‘Everyone has the right, as provided by an Act, 
to earn his or her livelihood …’. Section 19, on the right to social 
security, provides in part: ‘Everyone shall be guaranteed by 
an Act the right to basic subsistence.’ In this approach Finland 
has a robust constitutional framework protecting economic 
and social rights but the legislature retains a strong degree of 
control over how these rights are interpreted and enforced. 
In this approach, the courts perform ex post judicial review 
in the context of the legislation introduced to fulfil economic 
and social rights.
It should be noted, however, that in two respects the approach 
in Finland does not leave matters entirely in the hands of the 
legislature. First, whilst the Finnish example places a strong 
emphasis on the legislature as the state body responsible for 
implementing economic and social rights there are some 
constitutional economic and social rights provisions which 
are treated as creating subjective justiciable minimum-core 
rights, such as Article 19(1), which protects the right to social 
assistance, in particular in connection with issues such as 
emergency health care based on the concept of dignity. 
Second, the Finish constitutional model is supported by a 
Constitutional Committee that scrutinises legislation for 
economic and social rights compatibility pre-enactment, 
so-called ex ante review. By convention, Parliament complies 
with this review, in contrast with the weaker force of pre-
legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament conducted by the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights where the decisions of the 
Committee are not considered binding on Parliament.
From the outset, there appear to be a number of contextual 
factors that make protection of economic and social rights 
via directive principles appear a potentially viable option in 
Northern Ireland. Firstly, this approach appears particularly 
common in countries whose constitutional tradition derives 
from English common law. Ireland, India, Ghana, Malta, 
Nigeria and Papua New Guinea are among the jurisdictions 
which have constitutionalised economic and social rights 
using directive principles. From this perspective, the model 
may be compatible with the underlying common law tradition 
in Northern Irish law.
Secondly, the incorporation of economic and social rights 
into constitutional documents as directive principles appear 
to have been used in transitional settings as a means of 
addressing past discriminations or injustices and committing 
the State to a future vision of society that moves on from 
the violations of the past. This has been the case in India 
and Nepal, for example.32 Directive principles have been 
considered powerful in these contexts as representing ‘a code 
of conduct according to which the governance of the country 
should take place’, for example, ‘given the socio-economic 
needs of Indian society, the directive principles provide the 
framework for a “peaceful political revolution”’.33 The model 
of directive principles, therefore, holds potential to gesture 
towards a new shared future and act as a means to balance the 
need to recognise and enhance ESR, and previous exclusions 
from social and economic power, in societies moving on 
from conflict with the concern that full justiciability of socio-
economic rights is not possible for resource reasons or due to 
concerns regarding judicial interference with policy decisions 
and implementation of economic and social rights.
Thirdly, the directive principles model by its nature may be 
compatible with the Northern Ireland context as research 
indicates that it works more effectively in democratic societies 
with a strong civil society base capable of holding legislators 
and policymakers to account.34 The directive principle model 
works via political as opposed to legal accountability; as such, 
a strong civil society base, including a strong human rights 
sector, is advisable in order to maximise the effect of directive 
principles. Although civil society appears under considerable 
strain at present, due to reductions in resources, Northern 
Ireland has traditionally had a very strong civil society base, 
including a strong cohort of human rights organisations 
capable of undertaking such political work.35
Indeed, there may be additional strategic reasons why human 
rights and civil society actors may pursue constitutionalising 
economic and social rights via something similar to directive 
principles as opposed to enforceable provisions. As Kalestski 
et al highlight, calls for directly enforceable economic and 
social rights often generates ‘enormous political opposition 
and battles from well-funded interests. The political energy 
necessitated could be better used on social mobilization and 
policy change through different avenues, including statutory 
law’.36 While the approaches we have examined may be 
non-justiciable, they may achieve a similar effect in terms of 
providing a stable constitutional provision to hold politicians 
and policymakers to account.
Fourthly, following on from this, the non-justiciability of 
directive principles may not be perceived as such a significant 
drawback as it may look on first glance. Lack of judicial 
enforcement does not render directive principles irrelevant. 
Their value lies in the ability they possess to shape the context 
within which politics and law-making takes place and give 
constitutional significance to the value and importance of 
economic and social rights. As was stated in the Indian case 
of Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India, ‘merely because the 
directive principles are not enforceable in a court of law, it 
does not mean that they are of subordinate importance to any 
part of the Constitution or that they cannot create obligations 
or duties binding on the State… In fact, non-compliance 
with the directive principles would be unconstitutional’.37 In 
addition, consideration of comparative experience, explored 
further below, suggests that courts can still invoke and 
utilise directive principles in their decisions. The Supreme 
Court of Ghana has asserted that it is mandated to apply 
the directive principles in interpreting law. The Supreme 
Court of India has taken an even more activist stance and 
engaged directive principles when interpreting fundamental 
constitutional rights. Thus, while directive principles cannot 
compel a particular form of government action, comparative 
experience, particularly that of the Indian courts, does suggest 
that they can be a powerful tool in interpreting legislative 
provision and executive action as well as enforceable 
constitutional rights.38
As a common law jurisdiction with a strong civil society base 
to hold the legislature and executive politically accountable for 
failure to take account of directive principles, there appears 
to be scope for the protection of economic and social rights 
by adopting this approach in Northern Ireland. In addition, 
the strong statement that the constitutionalisation of directive 
principles would make, as a state-led commitment to address 
the socio-economic exclusion of the past, appears to be 
appropriate to Northern Ireland as a society transitioning 
from conflict. Integrating economic and social protections 
into a constitutional document such as a Bill of Rights for 
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Northern Ireland would be a compromise between those 
who view fully enforceable and justiciable economic and 
social rights provisions with trepidation, and those who view 
economic and social rights protections as unacceptably 
inadequate. There is also considerable scope to determine 
the role of the judiciary in enforcement which, as is evident 
from comparative experience, can take a strong or weak 
form. Adoption of the Finnish model could also be viewed 
as a middle ground between weak- and strong-form judicial 
review.39
(5) Drawbacks of the directive principles model
From the above, there are a number of strengths to the 
directive principles model generally and, in particular, 
when considered in light of the Northern Ireland contextual 
factors considered earlier. However, it is important to note 
that the model also demonstrates significant drawbacks that 
have become evident in other jurisdictions and that appear 
repeatedly in legal academic scholarship considering this 
model. There is another basis point that needs to be 
considered in arriving at a conclusion as to whether or not 
Directive Principles are a good idea, which is that the answer 
to some extent very much depends on the exact wording of 
those Principles.
The first, and perhaps most significant, drawback of the 
model relates to the context of devolved powers in the United 
Kingdom. In several socio-economic areas, the Northern 
Ireland Assembly and Executive shares its powers with 
Westminster/Whitehall, or is subject to control by it. This 
raises the question of whether directive principles would be 
capable of application to areas outside the direct and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Northern Ireland Assembly/Executive.
Secondly, and more generally, directive principles by their 
nature cannot ensure realisation or enforcement of economic 
and social rights. This model cannot provide a legal guarantee 
that economic and social rights will be taken seriously and 
integrated into legislative and executive action, relying on 
political will in placing primary responsibility to implement 
with the Northern Ireland Assembly. In the context of 
Northern Ireland, where a not insignificant number of elected 
representatives appear to oppose economic and social rights,40 
directive principles do not provide the teeth to compel 
action. In addition, several empirical studies have indicated 
that the constitutionalisation of economic and social rights 
as directive principles does not necessarily translate into 
tangible social change. For example, Edwards and Marin found 
in their study of 61 countries that constitutionalisation of the 
right to education did not lead to higher test scores, and the 
quality of education depended on a number of other socio-
economic, structural and policy variables.41 In a wider study 
that incorporated a wider range of economic and social rights 
issues, Kalestski et al concluded that ‘there is no evidence that 
constitutional provisions as directive principles are correlated 
with the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index, 
but there is a correlation between enforceable law and the 
overall SERF Index and the individual component on the right 
to education, health and food… In contrast to the beliefs of 
some human rights advocates that directive principles are a 
better approach, these results indicate that only enforceable 
law provisions are positively correlated with fulfilment of 
economic and social rights, at least as measurable by the SERF 
Index’.42 Such research indicates that directive principles are 
not as effective as enforceable provisions in terms of securing 
realisation of economic and social rights.
Thirdly, an argument has also been made that 
constitutionalising economic and social rights as directive 
principles further adds to the perception that they are 
‘secondary’ or ‘lesser’ human rights provisions, and so 
undermines the claimed indivisibility of human rights. 
Particularly in a state like the UK that currently has justiciable 
‘civil and political rights’ (albeit that the scope of convention 
rights go beyond civil and political), any approach that does 
not adopt a similar approach for the enforcement of ESR is 
likely to be seen as confirming the latter’s second-class status. 
In this respect, while the achievement of constitutionalising 
economic and social rights as directive principles may be 
perceived as significant and politically symbolic, it may work 
in practice to reinforce the secondary status of such rights 
provision. This is an argument that is made by Mureinik 
who argues that ‘to make economic rights mere interpretive 
presumptions, is plainly to declare them worth less than 
the first-generation rights; the precise opposite of the 
effect sought, in most cases, by those who favour directive 
principles’.43 For Mureinik, this drawback outweighs the 
advantages of directive principles as presumptions of statutory 
interpretation. Indeed, in discussions surrounding changes 
to the Constitution of Nepal, the International Commission of 
Jurists expressed the view that constitutionalising economic 
and social rights as directive principles does not reflect 
contemporary international human rights practice that asserts 
the equal weighting of civil and political rights and economic 
and social rights.44
A fourth reason why the directive principles approach has 
been treated with caution by some legal commentators relates 
to the role of the judiciary. This role can vary, as demonstrated 
in the differences between the Indian experience, where 
judges have taken an active role, and the Irish experience, 
where the judiciary have expressed caution and a marked 
deference to the legislature and executive. The role of the 
judiciary appears to be an important element in enforcement 
and use of directive principles, but it is one that is significantly 
unpredictable. As noted above, therefore, although principal 
responsibility for implementation of directive principles 
would lie with the Northern Ireland Assembly, the judiciary 
could play a role in enforcement. The Northern Irish judiciary 
may initially adopt a conservative interpretation of directive 
principles, but this could not be guaranteed now, or in the 
future.45
For Wiles, it is hard to justify the use of deliberately non-
justiciable directions about rights as enforceable in court, 
when their justiciable status is likely to be determined at the 
whim of the judiciary in place at any one time.46
There is also controversy among scholars as to whether an 
activist or a conservative judicial role would be preferable. A 
conservative judicial role would place a greater onus on civil 
society to hold the legislature and executive accountable for 
failing to act in a way that is informed by directive principles. 
Wiles concludes that ‘it seems evidence that explicit legal 
enforceability is needed in order for social and economic 
rights to have legitimacy, credibility and consistency as 
human rights in the long term, as an operative part of the 
legal system’.47 However, an activist judicial approach to 
directive principles is not necessarily desirable. Wiles argues 
that the approach of the Indian courts, while on one level 
commendable, has put into question the strict separation of 
powers, and eroded legal certainty.
In short, there are considerable drawbacks to the directive 
principle model which must be taken into account. Of 
primary importance is the obstacle posed by current rules on 
devolution, which mean that the Northern Ireland Assembly 
does not have exclusive power over economic and social 
rights issues. This makes the adoption of directive principles 
complex and would require consideration and navigation of 
the role of Westminster/Whitehall and their role in legislative 
activity. In addition, while there is considerable scope to 
shape the role of the judiciary in enforcement of directive 
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principles, it is likely (but not certain) that judicial interpretation 
in Northern Ireland would follow the Irish as opposed to the 
Indian experience, with considerable deference being shown 
by the judiciary to the Northern Ireland Assembly. In the Irish 
context, as has been outlined, some recent thinking has moved 
away from the directive principles approach due to the lack 
of impact that it has had, in no small part due to the approach 
taken by the Irish courts, and recent empirical studies elsewhere 
have indicated that directive principles are limited in achieving 
tangible protection and realisation of economic and social rights 
leading Seervai to describe them as ‘rhetorical language, hopes, 
ideals and goals rather than the actual reality of government’.
Nevertheless, the question, as with each of the models we have 
considered, is: compared to what? The directive principles 
approach may be less effective than some other methods, but 
more effective than doing nothing.
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REVIEW, SUCH AS 
ON GROUNDS OF 
REASONABLENESS
Courts in the United Kingdom currently 
interpret and apply human rights set out in 
the Human Rights Act using an approach 
that sets a high bar for those seeking to justify 
breaches of human rights. An approach 
could be adopted that required courts to 
set a much lower bar in the context of ESR. 
The model examined here is one based 
on restricted judicial review, an approach 
that differs from the ‘full justiciability’ 
recommendation of the NIHRC, in its 
advice to the Secretary of State. The starting 
point for the discussion in this chapter is 
the proposal (which includes a draft Bill of 
Rights) from the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights of the House of Commons and House 
of Lords in their 2008 report on a ‘Bill of 
Rights for the UK’.1 The model discussed in 
this chapter is a modified version of the 
South African approach to the protection of 
ESR and captures well the idea of a restricted 
form of judicial intervention.2 In reaching 
its conclusions, the Committee rejected fully 
justiciable and legally enforceable ESR,3 
as well as the Directive principles of state 
policy option.4
(1) What is the Model?
The rationale for the Joint Committee’s preferred, and more 
legally constrained formulation, was precisely to offer an 
‘appropriately limited’ judicial role.5 This was at a time when 
Westminster was showing tentative signs of being more open 
to the recognition of these rights (subject to the usual political 
concerns about judicial overreach) than it appears to be 
currently.6 The Committee stated:
‘The broad scheme of these provisions is to impose a duty 
on the Government to achieve the progressive realisation 
of the relevant rights, by legislative or other measures, 
within available resources, and to report to Parliament on 
the progress made; and to provide that the rights are not 
enforceable by individuals, but rather that the courts have a 
very closely circumscribed role in reviewing the measures 
taken by the Government.’7 (emphasis removed)
The Committee was persuaded that ESR should be included8 
and the report identifies (as a first step) rights to health care, 
education, housing and an adequate standard of living, as 
appropriate rights to include in a Bill of Rights.9 It is plain 
that while the Committee heard much to suggest that 
consensus might be hard to obtain, it remained determined 
to find a model that might prove politically acceptable.10 The 
Committee argued that these were rights that people could 
genuinely relate to (the ownership question), and that their 
inclusion would help to counter common myths surrounding 
human rights (that they are only for ‘criminals or terrorists’).11
(2) How would these rights be realised?
There were five steps in the Committee’s proposal. First, there 
would be an obligation on the Government to secure the 
progressive realization of these rights (a requirement to take 
‘reasonable legislative or other measures, within its available 
resources’).12 Second, the Government would have to report 
on progress in securing these rights annually to Parliament.13 
Third, and subject to other rights listed in the proposal (such 
as equality), it would be a matter for Parliament to decide 
on those who were eligible for such rights on, for example, 
grounds of nationality and residence.14 Fourth, these rights 
would not be enforceable directly by individuals but would be 
taken into account in the interpretation of legislation, and in 
determining the ‘reasonableness’ of measures taken to achieve 
progressive realisation.15 Fifth, the Committee listed a range 
of considerations that the courts should have regard to when 
considering reasonableness (again, drawing heavily on South 
African approaches).16 These included such considerations as 
whether the measures were discriminatory, but emphasising 
that the court could not investigate whether ‘public money 
could be better spent’.17
The model advanced by the Joint Committee thus attempted 
to provide for the recognition of some ESR by express 
inclusion in a Bill of Rights for the UK. Although confined to 
Schedule 3 of the proposed Bill, the provisions should be 
read in the context of the overall scheme of the proposed 
new instrument. For example, it included interpretative 
provisions that would amplify the role of international law, 
set down a strong interpretative obligation with respect to 
the rights in the Bill of Rights, embraced the idea of impact 
assessments for any new legislative proposals, and built-in a 
five-year parliamentary review of the operation of the Bill.18 
Such a review could, for example, assess how successful or 
not the initial approach to ESR has been, and might prove 
especially useful as a means of determining how effective the 
mechanisms were in their early years.
Although the report was careful to refute the traditional 
sceptical arguments about the role of judges, it does address 
these points to the extent that it seeks to limit (but not 
displace) the judicial role.19 So, the intention is to carefully 
confine the judicial role to ‘reasonableness review’, in 
terms that would be well understood within administrative 
law (albeit that reasonableness would be likely to have a 
distinctive meaning, going beyond the so-called Wednesbury 
reasonableness standard, in line with the reasonableness test 
adopted in South Africa, and the more expansive test adopted 
by the UN’s ESCR Committee.20
This approach meets critics of ESR part of the way by soothing 
anxieties about the judiciary, but also addresses concerns 
about second-class rights by ‘constitutionalising’ them in a 
Bill of Rights for the UK. The work of giving life to these rights 
is then left primarily to the Government and to Parliament, 
with the courts having a review function (to ensure that they 
are not entirely neglected). This takes the debate directly into 
Parliament, for example, through the annual report to be 
submitted by the Government. It does leave the door ajar for 
judicial intervention, with the clear plan that this would be a 
‘light touch’ framework that would evolve as judges began to 
grapple with the new constitutional measure.
A variation on this approach can be found in Canada, 
where the federal judiciary have developed an approach to 
constitutional remedies that attempts to further a strongly 
dialogic relationship between the courts and the legislature. 
Guided by this understanding, the courts have the discretion 
to issue declarations of invalidity of an unconstitutional 
statute, but suspend the remedy for a period of time to 
allow the legislature to decide what to do. These so-called 
suspended or delayed declarations of invalidity first came 
to public prominence in 1985 in the Reference re Manitoba 
Language Rights case,21 in which the Supreme Court of 
Canada decided that most of the statutes enacted in Manitoba 
between 1890 and 1985 were invalid. The Court considered 
that there would be chaos if this declaration of invalidity came 
into effect immediately, and the Court instead declared the 
1 Joint Committee on Human Rights, A Bill of Rights for the UK? (Twenty-ninth report, 2007-08) HL 165-
I HC 150 I. Note that two members of the Committee (Lord Bowness and the Earl of Onslow) attempted 
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legislation temporarily valid to enable the legislature to have 
enough time to re-enact the laws in a proper manner. Over 
time, however, the threat of legal chaos justification for the use 
of these suspended declarations has been replaced by a much 
more extensive justification: that delaying the onset of invalidity 
is justified where it is useful to allow the legislature to consult 
and consider alternative arrangements to replace the invalid 
legislation.22 Such remedies might be thought to be particularly 
suitable in the context of light-touch judicial review of socio-
economic rights. It is worth noting that the UK Supreme Court 
does have, and has exercised, the power to issue suspensive 
orders. In Salveson v Riddell a provision in an Act of the Scottish 
Parliament was held to be outside the legislative competence of 
that Parliament. The Supreme Court made an order suspending 
the effect of its decision until the defect in the Act was 
corrected.23
(3) What are the advantages and disadvantages?
In assessing the advantages and disadvantages of this Model, 
the litmus test must be the more effective practical realisation 
of ESR. The assumption is that these are rights that must be 
implemented in ways that result in tangible change for the poor, 
vulnerable and marginalised. They should be more than mere 
constitutional ornamentation. Will this model deliver for those 
who need these rights most? This must also be followed by 
an assessment of the prospects for any UK-wide Bill of Rights. 
It seems an unlikely prospect in the near future, however 
the model proposed by the Joint Committee still provides an 
example of a possible approach (and one that could, in theory, be 
mapped onto Northern Ireland practice).
The principal advantage is that ESR are clearly acknowledged 
as part of a Bill of Rights (and thus directly constitutionalised), 
with mechanisms (including judicial) to advance implementation 
and enforcement. It would be easy to skip over this as self-
evident and banal, but in a climate of political hostility to human 
rights this would be an important achievement. There is little 
reason to believe that some of the anticipated negative political 
reaction against the incorporation of ESR has dissipated in the 
intervening period.
The proposal would give firm legal recognition to claims that 
many in the UK now regard as fundamental, on health care, 
education, and housing, and on the need for an adequate 
standard of living. It would allow for a period of testing that might 
allow further steps to be taken. It would also accord a role for 
each branch of government. In principle at least, the advantage 
is that this model has the potential to bring ESR into the heart 
of parliamentary democracy, with built-in devices to ensure 
that they continue to shape law, policy and practice. Although 
there is a risk that this will slip into ‘tick-box’ proceduralism or 
programmatic symbolism empty of rights-based substance, 
there is always the chance, if political and bureaucratic 
leadership (combined with civic engagement) asserts itself, that 
it may deliver substantive social justice outcomes. It might force 
all in the public sphere to abandon a ‘charity’-infused mind-
set in favour of the direct legal recognition in a constitutional 
document of rights-holders and duty-bearers, and thus 
challenge more vacuous notions of social justice and well-being.
There are, however, several potential disadvantages to this Model 
of delivering ESR. There is the risk (inherent in much of what 
is proposed in our report) that, in seeking to gain respectability 
and acceptance for tactical reasons, the model sacrifices core 
principles. Even though many of the objections to possible 
judicial ‘mission creep’ are frequently rejected in the literature, 
the model reflects a willingness to accommodate these concerns. 
There is a real risk of going too far in anticipating resistance 
and ending up reaffirming an impoverished vision of these 
particular rights. The image of ESR as second-class would be 
perpetuated, reflected in provisions that plainly state that they 
are non-enforceable by individuals against the Government 
or any public authority.24 This matters because it can lead to a 
‘reasonableness review’ that does little to achieve rights-based 
outcomes in practice, resulting in the neglect, and a general lack 
of enforcement, of these rights.
As is well known, although open to interpretative development, 
‘reasonableness’ sets a high threshold for judicial engagement in 
this context. As Dennis Davis notes:
‘[I]t is doubtful whether a court will conceive of reasonableness 
in any way other than as involving deference to the decisions of a 
democratically elected legislature and executive. Reasonableness 
is a standard judges understand within the context of 
administrative law in which deference to the competence and 
democratic pedigree of the executive authority or the legislature 
is well established.’25
It should not be assumed, of course, that establishing strict 
parameters within which judges are expected to operate is 
negative in itself. This may be either good or bad, depending on 
context. A judiciary that is essentially hostile to ESR, if given too 
much interpretative room, might adopt unhelpfully problematic 
interpretations and even undercut what might be a more 
progressive response by politicians, or vice versa.
In the absence of a sustained political and societal commitment 
to the realisation of ESR, it is possible that a reasonableness-
based approach will not lead to the expected gains. This opens 
the question of whether the fault lies in the inadequacy of the 
legal tools or in forms of structural and individual resistance 
to these rights that no constitution could easily overcome. The 
inclusion of ESR in a Bill of Rights, coupled with this model, 
might, however, offer useful normative foothold that could be 
developed.
(4) What is the comparative experience?
This model explicitly draws on the South African experience, and 
examples are provided in the Committee report.26 In advancing 
this approach, the Committee clearly felt it was adhering to a 
middle path represented by the South African jurisprudence,27 
in a way that would ease political concerns about judicial 
colonisation of socio-economic policy.
The literature on this comparative example is vast and 
assessment of the empirical evidence remains work in progress. 
The difficulty in drawing on this example is that the initial 
optimism around the South African Constitution,28 and the work 
of the Constitutional Court in particular, faded somewhat when 
early expectations were not met. Part of the reason for this is that 
the Court was evidently grappling with the imperatives of ESR, 
while also acknowledging critiques of justiciability and the limits 
on its own role achieving in societal transformation under the 
new Constitution. As Aoife Nolan, for example, observes:
‘[I]ts emphasis upon the procedural rather than the substantive 
aspects of socio-economic rights obligations, together with the 
employment of a relatively weak standard of “reasonableness” 
review, and a consistent refusal to interpret such rights as giving 
rise to directly enforceable entitlements, has resulted in that 
jurisprudence being criticized for providing only limited benefits 
to the poor.’29
It may not have led to expected gains (a conclusion that is in 
itself open to continuing empirical verification) but it is an 
approach that is not devoid of merit, and it can be a useful tool.30 
The South African example shows that the approach adopted 
allows questions to be raised about the design, enactment and 
implementation of a relevant government programme, including 
whether appropriate resources have been set aside, whether it 
can lead to the realisation of the right, or whether the process is 
transparent.31 There is also a significant interplay with equality 
29
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rights, for example, where a particular group is excluded 
from the programme.32 It provides clear constitutional 
recognition of ESR, combined with a role for the judiciary 
in their ‘enforcement’. It is plain that these are rights to be 
taken seriously and the Constitutional Court, for example, has 
shown that it is willing to do so. However, it offers a degree of 
deference to the executive and legislature in addressing socio-
economic rights that is not accorded to other rights, and this 
approach might well solidify the sense of unequal treatment 
between supposedly interdependent and indivisible rights.
In assessing this model, as in assessing each of the other 
models, we come back to the question of what the function of 
the model is perceived to be. In reaching conclusions about 
the South African judicial response, Sandra Liebenberg can be 
seen as arguing for a reconceived version of ‘reasonableness 
review’. ‘Reasonableness review,’ she observes, ‘… promotes 
dialogic engagement on the content and purposes of socio-
economic rights which accords with the deliberative aspects 
of South Africa’s constitutional democracy.’33 This form 
of review is clearly much more than Wednesbury 
unreasonableness. The weaknesses do, however, remain.
Turning now to the experience in Canada of the suspended 
declarations of invalidity, commentators have identified 
both potentially positive and negative effects.34 On the one 
hand, delayed declarations of invalidity can be seen as 
useful in enabling a smooth transition from invalidity to 
constitutionality, particularly where the costs of an immediate 
transition with no lead-in period would be excessive. 
Government may genuinely need time to review complex 
alternatives, and delay may also enable those who have 
relied on the invalid legislation to rearrange their affairs in an 
appropriate manner. Such delays assume, and seek to further 
deepen, institutional dialogue between the courts and the 
legislature based on good faith consultation and collaboration 
between these institutions. On the other hand, the use of this 
remedy has been seen as being problematic: it temporarily 
extends invalid laws and creates tensions with the rule of law; 
the legislature may not, in the end, comply or may not act in 
good faith; constitutional norms may be under-enforced or 
ignored; and such remedies may (paradoxically) increase the 
likelihood of courts invalidating legislation by reducing the 
costs of striking legislation down.
(5) How does this fit with the project context?
The work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights was 
directed to the adoption of a Bill of Rights for the UK, with 
comparatively little thought devoted to devolution. This 
Report, on the other hand, explores the position in Northern 
Ireland in areas that are primarily (but not exclusively) 
devolved matters. The model under consideration in this 
chapter would, therefore, require legislation (even perhaps 
Assembly legislation) and it would appear to assume the 
adoption of a Bill of Rights, with ‘reasonable review’ (of ESR) as 
one part of that package. This would likely be within a Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland (rather than an overarching UK-
wide version).
Whatever view is taken of the merits of the approach, 
thought would be needed on how this relates to the existing 
advice provided by the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission on a Bill of Rights. That advice was directed to 
Westminster, and the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement is clear 
that it should be enacted in Westminster legislation. It is also 
plain from the Agreement that the new Bill of Rights should 
have a similar status as the ‘Convention rights’ have now in 
relation to the work of the Assembly and the Executive. The 
Commission did not opt for the type of model supported by 
the Joint Committee, so there is a risk that this will be viewed 
as undermining that approach and that it will open the door 
to the sort of unequal treatment between rights that the 
NIHRC wanted to avoid. The NIHRC’s insistence on parity 
between rights seems particularly persuasive, if the deferential 
approaches to politicised anxieties about these rights have 
proven successful.
Many of the ideas outlined by the Joint Committee have 
potential merit in Northern Ireland. The notion that ESR 
should inform the work of the democratic institutions 
is commendable, and requiring the Executive to report 
annually to an Assembly where there is an ‘official opposition’ 
might encourage more extensive consideration of these 
rights. In a context where devolved government is still to be 
embedded, and the likelihood of conflict over questions of 
resource allocation and policy development, the Northern 
Ireland judiciary might feel more comfortable with a form 
of ‘reasonableness review’ that accords them only a ‘light 
touch’ role. Although the test is distinctive, they would also 
be familiar with the language of such an approach; as with 
judges throughout the UK, they already have experience 
of adjudicating on socio-economic matters, human rights 
and even disputes between Ministers in the Northern 
Ireland Executive. From other perspectives, this model 
might, however, be viewed as the continuation of a weak 
and ineffective framework for the enforcement of human 
rights, and evidence of the unequal treatment accorded 
socio-economic rights. What, exactly, would a light touch 
review achieve if judges are expected to be very deferential to 
executive policy-making?
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CHAPTER 6:
ESR CONDITIONALITY IN 
TRADE AGREEMENTS
As we identified at the beginning of this 
Report, our brief was to identify possible 
methods of delivering ESR in Northern 
Ireland in order to stimulate debate about 
how ESR could be better delivered, even if 
the approach of full justiciability of the full 
range of internationally-required ESR is not 
adopted. In the main, the previous models 
discussed have involved actions being taken 
by one or more institutions in a restored 
devolved government. This fifth model has 
been developed specifically to address the 
circumstances that apply following ‘Brexit’ 
and also focuses on what the Assembly and 
the Executive may do, but in the case of this 
model, in co-operation with other actors.
This chapter proceeds, as have the previous chapters, on the 
assumption that devolved government will continue, and 
considers what role, if any, the devolved institutions might 
take on to further ESR in a post-Brexit Northern Ireland. We 
have taken into account, in this context, the specific reference 
to the need for the Ad hoc Assembly Committee agreed in the 
New Decade, New Agreement of 2020 to consider the impact 
of Brexit on rights protection, as well as the provisions already 
agreed in the Ireland-Northern Ireland Protocol relating to 
the protection of rights deriving from the Belfast-Good Friday 
Agreement (discussed earlier).
The core idea explored in this chapter is how the Northern 
Ireland Executive and Assembly could influence future trade 
negotiations in such a way as to protect existing levels of 
ESR from being down-graded as a result of exiting the EU. 
This involves two possible interventions by the devolved 
institutions: an intervention in the next few weeks and months 
in the negotiations between the EU and the UK on the future 
relations agreement, and an intervention in negotiations 
between the UK and other non-EU states, such as the United 
States, in particular in order to prevent ESR being undermined 
by future trade and investment agreements concluded by the 
UK Government.
(1) ESR in negotiations between the UK and the EU
(i) The route not taken: ESR in the Ireland-Northern Ireland 
Protocol
There are two separable phases in the negotiations with the 
UK concerning ‘Brexit’. The first set of negotiations concerned 
the exit arrangements. The first phase negotiations have been 
completed, and the Withdrawal Agreement has been agreed 
between the UK Government and the EU. The negotiation 
of the Withdrawal Agreement, and the Ireland-Northern 
Ireland Protocol initially led to a draft Agreement in which 
ESR were initially quite prominent. Readers will recollect that 
it was originally envisaged under the Protocol that the United 
Kingdom as a whole (i.e. including Northern Ireland) would, 
until a new Future Relationship Agreement was concluded, 
form a new single customs territory with the EU. This complex, 
and controversial arrangement – controversial both within 
the EU and in the UK – was intended to address the problem 
of preventing a customs border on the island of Ireland, 
whilst at the same time preventing a customs border between 
Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. Within the EU, one 
of the controversial aspects of the new arrangement was the 
potential for the UK to benefit from access to the EU markets, 
whilst at the same time lowering its regulatory standards, 
thus allowing the UK to reduce the price of goods. As a result, 
draft Article 6 of the Protocol provided that “With a view to 
ensuring the maintenance of the level playing field conditions 
required for the proper functioning of this paragraph, the 
provisions set out in Annex 4 to this Protocol shall apply.”1 Part 
3 of Annex 4 referred to labour and social standards in this 
context.
Article 4 of Annex 4 provided that a set of labour and social 
standards would apply throughout the UK, but it did not set 
out the relevant EU labour and social standards. Instead, as is 
the practice in many free trade agreements concluded with 
the EU, the approach taken was to require non-regression 
by the UK (and the EU) from labour and social standards that 
existed in the UK (and the EU) at the end of the transition 
period. The EU and the United Kingdom, it provided, ‘shall 
ensure that the level of protection provided for by law, 
regulations and practices is not reduced below the level 
provided by the common standards applicable within the 
Union and the United Kingdom at the end of the transition 
period in the area of labour and social protection and as 
regards fundamental rights at work, occupational health and 
safety, fair working conditions and employment standards, 
information and consultation rights at company level, and 
restructuring.’ The ‘common standards applicable within 
the Union and the United Kingdom’ were effectively those 
established in EU law, and thus the effect of the provision was 
to require the UK to maintain the existing standards set by EU 
law. No diminution of these standards  
was permissible.
Article 6 of the Annex provided for the monitoring and 
enforcement of these labour and social standards. The UK 
‘shall ensure effective enforcement of Article 4 and of its 
laws, regulations and practices reflecting those common 
standards in its whole territory.’ The UK shall further 
‘maintain an effective system of labour inspections, ensure 
that administrative and judicial proceedings are available in 
order to permit effective action against violations of its laws, 
regulations and practices, and provide for effective remedies, 
ensuring that any sanctions are effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive and have a real and deterrent effect.’ Beyond 
maintaining existing common standards, the UK and the 
EU initially agreed, to ‘protect and promote social dialogue 
on labour matters among workers and employers, and 
their respective organisations, and governments.’ Particular 
emphasis was placed on ILO  
standards and the Council of Europe Social Charter.
The draft Protocol established a separate process for the 
domestic implementation, monitoring and enforcement 
of the labour and social rights under the level-playing field 
provisions of the Protocol. Article 6 of Annex 4 to the Protocol 
provided that ‘the United Kingdom shall ensure effective 
enforcement’ of the non-regression obligation, and of ‘its laws, 
regulations and practices reflecting those common standards’. 
The Article went further, however, in requiring that the UK 
‘shall maintain an effective system of labour inspections, 
ensure that administrative and judicial proceedings are 
available in order to permit effective action against violations 
of its laws, regulations and practices, and provide for 
effective remedies, ensuring that any sanctions are effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive and have a real and deterrent 
effect.’
The Protocol as finally agreed by the UK and the EU did not 
include these provisions, and therefore only Article 2 of the 
Protocol remains as a possible basis for protecting aspects of 
ESR in Northern Ireland affected adversely by Brexit. There 
is, therefore, a gap between what was anticipated in the draft 
Protocol and what is currently applicable regarding ESR in the 
ultimately agreed in the final Withdrawal Agreement.
1 Article 6 also provided: “Where appropriate, the Joint Committee may 
modify Annex 4 in order to lay down higher standards for these level 
playing field conditions.”
31
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND: MODELS OF ENFORCEABILITY NOVEMBER 2020
2 European Commission, Task Force for Relations with the United Kingdom, Draft text of the 
Agreement on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom Origin: 18 March 2020 UKTF (2020) 14.
3 HM Government, The Future Relationship with the EU: The UK’s Approach to Negotiations, February 
2020, CP211, Para 75.
4 Para 31.
(ii) EU ‘future relations’ negotiations with the UK
The second phase of negotiations is currently underway, and 
involves negotiating the future relationship between the EU 
and the UK, including trading relationships. The EU will be 
concerned to ensure that the UK should be prevented from 
‘unfairly’ competing against EU Member States, by reducing 
existing ESR norms, and that the EU should not be required  
to do business with a neighbour State that does not 
adequately protect human rights. The ESR issue is tackled in 
these contexts, and therefore there is less likely to be a tailor-
made provision dealing specifically with Northern Ireland, 
and more likelihood that any such measures would apply to 
the UK as a whole.
Title III of the EU’s proposed draft agreement2 sets the 
protection of ESR firmly in the economic context of 
preventing ‘distortions of trade and unfair competitive 
advantages.’ ‘To that end,’ it continues, ‘the Parties are 
determined to maintain high standards in the areas of state 
aid, competition, state-owned enterprises, taxation, social 
and labour protection, environmental protection and the 
fight against climate change.’ The Parties would ‘agree to 
establish long-lasting and robust commitments that prevent 
distortions of trade and unfair competitive advantages and 
ensure that their mutual trade and investment contributes 
to sustainable development’, affirming ‘their commitment to 
continue improving their respective levels of protection with 
the goal of ensuring high levels of protection in the areas 
covered by this Title’.
As regards labour and social protection, the Parties would 
commit not to ‘adopt or maintain any measure that weakens 
or reduces the level of labour and social protection provided 
by the Party’s law and practices and by the enforcement 
thereof, below the level provided by the common standards 
applicable within the Union and the United Kingdom at 
the end of the transition period, and by their enforcement’. 
Labour and social protection covers: (i) fundamental rights 
at work, (ii) occupational health and safety standards, (iii) 
fair working conditions and employment standards, and (iv) 
information and consultation rights at company level, and 
(v) restructuring. In addition, each Party would commit to 
‘seek to increase, through its relevant law and practices and 
through the enforcement thereof, the level of labour and 
social protection above [that] level of protection.’ Where 
both Parties have increased the level of labour and social 
protection above that level ‘neither Party shall weaken or 
reduce its level of labour or social protection below a level 
of protection which is at least equivalent to that of the other 
Party’s increased level of labour and social protection.’
For the purpose of enforcement, each Party would ‘set up or 
maintain a transparent and adequately resourced system for 
the effective domestic enforcement, in particular an effective 
system of labour inspections; establish administrative and 
judicial proceedings, which shall allow public authorities and 
individuals to bring timely actions against violations of the 
labour and social law; and provide for remedies, including 
interim measures, which shall ensure that sanctions are 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive and have a real and 
deterrent effect.’ In addition, these provisions would be 
subject to the dispute settlement mechanism that would apply 
to the bulk of the other obligations in the Agreement, thus 
bringing a degree of international supervision of the UK’s and 
the EU’s compliance with these obligations.
Herein lies the major difference between the UK’s apparent 
position on labour and social protections and the EU’s 
position. The UK would not subject these provisions to the 
ordinary dispute settlement mechanism, preferring instead 
simply to rely on ‘cooperation provisions between the parties, 
including dialogue and exchange of best practice.’3
Turning now to consider the wider, human rights, that are 
related to, but go beyond labour and social protections, 
Part 3 of the Commission’s draft provides for a ‘security 
partnership’ between the UK and the EU, Title 1 of which sets 
out provisions governing law enforcement and judicial co-
operation in criminal matters. Continued cooperation under 
this Title is, however, provided to be ‘conditional upon the 
United Kingdom’s continued adherence to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Protocols 1, 6 and 13 thereto, 
as well as upon the United Kingdom giving continued effect to 
these instruments under its domestic law.’ Therefore, the draft 
continues, ‘in the event that the United Kingdom abrogates the 
domestic law giving effect to [these instruments] … or makes 
amendments [to them] to the effect of reducing the extent to 
which individuals can rely on them before domestic courts 
of the United Kingdom, this Title shall be suspended from 
the date such abrogation or amendment becomes effective.’ 
Suspension would itself be terminated, and co-operation 
begin again ‘on the date the United Kingdom domestic law 
giving effect to the said instruments again becomes effective.’
Although the UK, on the one hand, also considers that ‘[c]
ooperation [in the area of security] will be underpinned by the 
importance attached by the UK and the EU to safeguarding 
human rights, the rule of law and high standards of data 
protection,’ on the other hand, the agreement ‘should not 
specify how the UK or the EU Member States should protect 
and enforce human rights and the rule of law within their own 
autonomous legal systems.’4
(iii) The role of the devolved institutions
At various point in the process of the ‘future relations’ 
negotiations, there will be the opportunity for the devolved 
institutions to make their views felt on whether proposed 
texts are, or are not, satisfactory from their perspectives. The 
advantages of securing broad language of the type that the 
EU has proposed is the extent to which it would further the 
protection of ESR in Northern Ireland, in particular if the 
adequacy of adherence to the commitments were subject 
to the international dispute settlement process. The major 
downside of this approach, of course, is that it is not only 
dependent on the EU being prepared to assess whether the 
obligations have been complied with and complaining if 
necessary, but more importantly, it is dependent on the UK 
agreeing to these obligations in the first place. At best, the 
devolved institutions have a walk-on part in the process, 
rather than being in control.
(2) Non-EU negotiations with the UK
The assumption on which we have proceeded so far in this 
chapter is that it is in the interests of the EU for the UK to 
continue to conform to the European Social Model, which 
is, broadly, sympathetic to ESR. On the other hand, the 
assumption must be that in trade negotiations with non-EU 
states, we should proceed on the assumption that it is in 
the interests of non-EU states to reduce ESR protections in 
the UK where such protections could constitute what the 
non-EU state could consider ‘non-tariff barriers.’ It would 
be important for any future Northern Ireland Executive/
Assembly to be aware that, in contrast to the likely scenario in 
EU/UK negotiations, in which there could be an opportunity 
to further embed ESR in Northern Ireland, it is more likely that 
it would be necessary in negotiations with non-EU states that 
existing rights are not undermined.
In an important report, the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
on Human Rights has recommended that human rights 
should form a key component of any future trade deals with 
non-EU states after Britain’s exit from the European Union. 
In its report, the Committee correctly reported that the EU 
currently includes clauses on human rights in its international 
trade deals with non-EU member states and the Committee 
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recommended that the UK must use Brexit as an opportunity  
to set even higher standards. This recommendation was 
premised on the idea that the UK would be in the position of 
exporting human rights standards that it itself complied with, 
but the recommendation would equally well apply to the UK 
itself as a self-denying ordinance.
One way of tackling the problem of ESR being seen as non-
tariff barriers which would need to be removed in trade 
negotiations with non-EU states, such as the United States, 
would be for the Northern Ireland Executive to agree to  
insist that the UK Government should not conclude any 
international trade or investment agreement that would 
require the reduction of any existing UK ESR requirements  
in Northern Ireland.
(3) Scope of devolved powers
Much of what has been discussed in this chapter relates to 
institutions outside Northern Ireland, in particular the EU 
institutions and UK institutions. There are, however, several 
important roles that Northern Ireland institutions may wish to 
play in the context of the development of the various aspects 
of the negotiations discussed above. But do the Executive 
and Assembly have a role in recommending protections 
for ESR to the United Kingdom Government in future trade 
and investment agreements? At first sight, any role for the 
Assembly and the Executive in trade negotiations appears 
to be limited. In particular, international relations, including 
trade negotiations, is an excepted matter under the NIA 1998; 
it is clear that the legal authority to conduct such negotiations 
lies in Westminster/Whitehall.
However, clear commitments have been made that the 
devolved administrations are to have an advisory/consultative 
role in setting the UK’s negotiating mandate for such 
negotiations. In its White Paper of February 2019,5 the UK 
Government announced ‘processes [that] will ensure that the 
priorities and expertise of the devolved administrations can 
shape and inform the development of the UK Government’s 
international trade policy and negotiating positions.’ A 
commitment is given that: ‘Where a new FTA requires 
legislation in order to implement it, the UK Government will 
continue to respect the devolution settlements and work with 
the devolved administrations to secure legislative consent 
for UK-wide legislation where appropriate.’ The Northern 
Ireland Assembly will thus have the opportunity to exercise 
some control over the future shape of ESR in Northern 
Ireland, in so far as this is affected by trade negotiations, 
through the operation of the Sewel Convention.6 The White 
Paper continued: ‘We recognise that the devolved legislatures 
also have a strong and legitimate interest in future trade 
agreements. It will be for each devolved legislature to 
determine how it will scrutinise their respective Governments 
as part of the ongoing process.’
In order to secure the passage of a Legislative Consent Motion, 
if such were requested and the Assembly was minded to 
consent, MLAs may wish to consider whether preconditions 
should be included as to how various aspects of the exit and 
trade negotiations with the EU and trade negotiations with 
non-EU states should be conducted, and these conditions 
could include specific requirements as to how ESR should 
be treated post-Brexit. In that context, several of the issues 
discussed in this chapter might be highly relevant.
Conclusion
This chapter assumes that the commitments made by the 
UK Government, that the devolved administrations will be 
involved in devising future trade policy, were made and will be 
operated in good faith. The issue that this chapter considered 
is how the Assembly and Executive might exercise that 
advisory/consultative role specifically in the area of ESR. We 
considered this initially in the context of negotiations between 
the EU and the UK, and then more broadly in the context of 
negotiations between the UK and other non-EU states.
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